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The Philosophy of History of American Historians

William L. Lucey, S. J.

College of the Holy Cross

SINCE the Civil War and the beginnings of graduate studies in history in American universities, American historians have had a strong leaning towards any deterministic philosophy of history that would reduce the part man plays in the making of history to the role of a robot. This advocacy of some form of determinism is indeed a strange phenomenon in a nation that has taken great pride in its traditional respect for the freedom and the rights of the individual and in its public recognition of the role of the individual American has played in the making of the United States of America. Why this tradition, if it is true, as one prominent historian claims, that "men have on the whole played the parts assigned; they have not written the play"? Why exalt and take pride in the achievements of outstanding Americans and the contributions of average American, if it is true that in the making of history "events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena but voluntary human effort"?¹

The historian is interested in man and man's conscious social activities conditioned by physical environment and cultural inheritance. Despite the multiplicity of causes and conditions behind the significant events and institutions of each succeeding generation, there is a constant as well as a variable element in human history. Very early in his study the historian has very definite ideas of what man is and what part man plays in the origin of these events and institutions and what factors contribute most to the constant and variable in human history. These ideas make up the basis of his philosophy of history.

Every historian has a philosophy of history. To question whether a particular historian has a philosophy of history or not is to question his intelligence; and the historian can not escape expressing it when he writes or teaches. To James Truslow Adams a philosophy of history is an obvious and necessary equipment of any historian:² "if there is no real science of history, there must clearly be something of a philosophy of history. I know the term is in bad repute but that does not make any difference. The thing simply must

exist." Recently a committee on historiography considered this point worthy of emphasis. Every written history, they declared:³

particularly that covering any considerable area of time and space, is a selection of facts made by some person or persons and is ordered or organized under the influence of some scheme of reference, interest, or emphasis—avowed or unavowed—in the thought of the author or authors.

One of the meanings given to a scheme or frame of reference is a philosophy of life, and from this report it would seem that one of the major advances in recent American historiography is that historians nowadays are clearly conscious of their frame of reference and principles of interpretation.⁴

Since every historian has a philosophy of history, it is obvious that this philosophy influences his or her historical writings and teaching. It will influence the selection of the testimony from the tested sources, the interpretation of the selected testimony, the selection of significant events and significant factors behind the events. Much of American history has been rewritten because new material has been discovered, much because of a faulty use of the historical methods; much, too, has been and will be rewritten because of a rejected philosophy of history.

There has been, however, a tendency among American historians to pretend an indifference to the philosophy of history. They scare away from the phrase and much prefer such terms as "a frame of reference" and "controlling assumptions" and "ideas of history." What they have in mind, however, is a philosophy of history.⁵ Or they play down the historian's philosophy of history and make much of the historian's ideas and principle of interpretation. Allen Nevins tells us that a general agreement on any philosophy of history is both impossible and undesirable; such an agreement among historians would reduce historical scholarship to the sterile tasks of "monkish" chroniclers. Yet the fact is, as Nevins admits, that both historians and readers of history are greatly interested in the application of ideas to history, that the historian's ideas (especially his ideas on man and man's origin and destiny) influence, the selection and interpretations of historical material, and that the value of his historical writings derive largely from the validity of these ideas.⁶ In other

¹ Edward P. Cheney, "Law in History," *American Historical Review*, XXIX (January, 1924), 235.

² "My Methods as a Historian," *The Saturday Review of Literature*, X (June 30, 1934.), 777. A good example is Macaulay. "A confident belief in Progress seems to have been the keynote of Macaulay's philosophy of history." Robert L. Schuyler, "Macaulay and His History—A Hundred Years After," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXIII (June, 1948), 189.

³ *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1946), p. 135, Proposition 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

⁵ See *Theory and Practice*, pp. 125-126 for the meaning of "frame of reference."

⁶ *The Gateway to History* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938), pp. 250, 241.

words, it is the historian's philosophy of history that counts.

It would be unfair, however, to give the impression that American historians have ignored the field of philosophy of history. Ever since Henry Adams, in his presidential address (1894) to the members of the American Historical Association urged his professional colleagues to search for and discover the laws of history, succeeding presidents have frequently devoted their annual addresses to this subject and their efforts have been supplemented by the contributions of members to the Association's *Review*.⁷ Before considering these contributions let us first see what is meant by a philosophy of history.

A *philosophy of history* aims to give some meaning to the whole history of human activity, to the patterns of uniformity and the variety of movements of past actuality: the rise and growth and decline of peoples and civilizations, the origins and development and continued vitality of some institutions and the gradual disintegration of others, the ebb and flow among cultures and nations. It is a search for and an understanding of the permanent, basic factors and forces (causes and conditions) behind historical continuity and change in human history. A philosophy of history is, then, a guide to a valid interpretation of historical material and to an understanding of the causality and significance of the events and institutions recorded in the historical material.

What are the possible permanent, basic factors and forces in human history?

There is man. History is the study of man's activities and, hence, he rates first consideration. What is man? It would seem vitally important to the intelligent study and understanding of history that there be a general agreement on what man's nature is. Is man in any way responsible for historical continuity and change; does he determine the course of events; or he is determined by some inner or external force to play the role he does?

There is the physical world where man lives and history takes place, his physical habitat: this globe called the earth. Man is influenced by the physical world outside him: the climate, the soil, the natural resources of the land. Man himself, as an animal, is part of this physical world; there is his racial strain or stock, the composition of his blood stream to consider. What parts do geographical factors or racial stock play in human activity?

There is the cultural milieu man lives in. As an animal he is constantly in need of material goods and

under the necessity of obtaining food, drink, and all kinds of goods and service in order to survive. As a social and political animal he is ordered towards life in a political society. He is, no doubt, influenced by the society he lives in: the intellectual, economic, scientific, moral and religious atmosphere of his generation and community. How important is this environment on man?

And there is the supernatural. If man is the creature of God, deriving his origin and destiny from Him, it is unreasonable to suppose that He has no interest in the world, in man and man's activities.⁸

What other factor can be named besides these four: man, the physical world he lives in, the cultural environment of his daily life, the supernatural? Any other that can be named would seem to be an aspect of one of these four. Indeed, some historians bridle at the inclusion of the supernatural as a causal factor in history. The reason for this will become apparent, but it is well to note here that when Bancroft was completing the revision of his *History* late in life the recognition of the supernatural as a causal factor in history did not seem incongruous to American scholars.⁹ Nor did it appear incongruous to most Presidents of the United States to recognize publicly the role of Divine Providence in the making of American history. That many American historians and scholars have during the last half century declared that the role of the supernatural as a causal factor in history is incongruous, is no evidence of progress towards a true understanding of human history. It means that they have rejected the supernatural.

All of these four factors are possible causal or conditioning forces in human activity, and these four seem to be sufficiently comprehensive to include any other particular force. Since this is so, a historian's philosophy of history must be derived from these four factors. The starting point of any philosophy of history is man. What is man? If one denies that man is both material and spiritual, both mind and matter, if one denies all causality from the free determination of man, then some factor or force either inside or outside of man must be called on to explain the uniformity and the variety of human activity, and the factor (or factors) selected will be the determining factor in history. The resulting philosophy will be *deterministic*.

A variety of deterministic philosophies of history has resulted from the denial of any and all causality to the free determination of man. One of the other three factors is made the dominant, exclusive cause of human events, and all history is explained in the terms of this determining force. It will be some force in the physical world outside of man like climate and soil or the complex of all geographical forces, or something physical within man like racial stock or sex urges, or some mechanistic force in the material world. Or it

⁷ Only one article in the *American Historical Review* is entitled philosophy of history (George B. Adams, "History and the Philosophy of History," XIV (January, 1909), 221-236, but other articles on such topics as history and materialism, religion the key to history, law in history, the interpretation of history, continuities in history, current of thoughts in historiography, fallacies in history, vagaries of historians, etc., are concerned with the problem of the philosophy of history. And Carl Becker in his article, "Everyman His Own Historian," XXXVII (January, 1932), 221-236, and Charles Beard in his "Written History as an Act of Faith," XXXIX (January, 1934), 219-231, are expounding their philosophy of history.

⁸ A fuller development of these four factors will be found in D. B. Zema, "Toward a Philosophy of History," *Historical Bulletin*, XIX (November, 1940), 3-4, 15-17.

⁹ Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943), p. 567.

The Straits Problem—Historical Background

Joseph S. Brusher, S. J.

Sacred Heart Novitiate

IN THIS peace no-peace we are enduring today there are many places where the revolutionary imperialism of the Soviet Union may strike against the defensive challenge of the West to precipitate the hideous thing which will be World War III. Among the places most charged with danger is Constantinople with its attendant waterways, the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, the historic Dardanelles. To realize how true this is, we have only to recall the fact that the so-called Truman doctrine, which marked the end of the appeasement, was a response to an attempt of the Soviet Union to force itself into control of these straits.

Few waterways have the romance of the series of narrows which connect the Black Sea with the Aegean. In Greek legend it was across the Hellespont (today's Dardanelles) that Leander swam to meet Hero and to find death. In Greek literature it was a fight against a town near the straits which gave us a world epic. In Greek history Xerxes had the Hellespont flogged, and Byzantium became a flourishing city. In a new era Constantine set his imperial capital there, and for long centuries Constantinople, the city of the emperors, stood a gleaming fossil of the old empire, a vision of majesty and beauty to the first Crusaders who could scarcely believe so great a city existed.

Captured by the unworthy Fourth Crusaders, recaptured by the Greeks, finally stormed by the mighty Mohammed II, Constantinople and the straits settled down to a lower level of existence as the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The wave of Turkish invasion dashing on the north and west, removed the straits from strategic considerations.

The emergence of a new power in the eighteenth century brought city and straits back into power politics. While Peter the Great raised up his artificial city on the Neva to give Russia a window on the north, he also had an eye south. For long, indeed, the princes of Muscovy had dreamed grandiose dreams of empire. For long they had been dreams—no more. But even in power politics (perhaps especially in power politics) dreams do count for much. Long ago in the fifteenth century Ivan the Great married Sophia, the niece of Constantine XI, the last of the Roman emperors. Constantine had died nobly on the walls of Constantinople, fighting the Turks to the end, a bitter end; for with him died at long last the Roman Empire of the East. When the doomed emperor's niece married the Prince of Moscow, the ambitious Ivan took the imperial eagle for his symbol and the thought of Moscow as the third Rome and heir to Constantinople became a Russian tradition.

The years moved by. Muscovy became Russia. Peter the Great broke through to the Baltic to give Russia her northern window. His efforts to break through to

an opening in the south were blocked. It was reserved to Catherine II to see the first step in the stately progress of the Russian eagle towards Constantinople and the straits. In 1774 the victorious army of the Czarina forced the Ottoman Empire to cede Azov and to open the straits to Russian merchantmen. This peace of Kuchuk Kainardji was the first successful move in a game which is not yet over. Catherine's second attempt was less successful. Generals, who were to win immortality on later European fields led her armies against the Sultan, but the Turks feeling that their very empire was at stake fought back fiercely. Catherine, on her part, was distracted by European problems, and so, in spite of the brilliance of Suovorov and Kutuzov, she contented herself with minor annexations in the Peace of Jassy.

When Catherine's grandson, the young Alexander, met Napoleon on the raft near Tilsit, it looked as if Russia might gain her goal. Surely in return for allowing France a free hand in the west Alexander could expect the same for Russia in the East, but in the words of Napoleon's secretary, Baron de Meneval: "Constantinople was the only point on which they were not visibly agreed."¹ Such was the glamour of Constantinople, such the strategic importance of the straits, that Napoleon could not find it in his heart to let Russia have both city and straits.

After the Vienna settlement had liquidated Napoleon's empire, the Russians continued their pressure south. Orthodox fellowship proved too much for autocratic legitimacy in the soul of Nicholas I, and Russian naval units cooperated with the British and French to blast the Turks out of Navarrino Bay, and help gallant little Greece gain her freedom. Greek independence was only one more sign that the Ottoman Empire was indeed the sick man of Europe. In 1833 it looked very much as if Ibrahim Pasha and his Egyptians would take over Constantinople and the empire. But to have a more vigorous dynasty on the Golden Horn by no means suited the Russians, and the czar was quick to send help to the hard-pressed sultan. A Russian fleet dropped anchor off Constantinople, and Russia made it plain that Ibrahim would not be permitted to enter the city of the emperors.

The grateful (and slightly over-awed) sultan thereupon concluded with Russia the treaty of Unkiar Iskelessi. By this treaty the czar's diplomacy gained what hitherto had been denied to his arms. For the treaty gave Russia great ascendancy over Turkey in the form of an offensive and defensive alliance. Above all, by a secret article the sultan agreed to close the straits if

¹ Baron Charles Francis de Meneval, *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte*, translator unknown, New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1910, 3 vols. II, 464.

Russian should be attacked. No foreign warships were to be permitted to enter the Dardanelles under any pretext.² Here was victory indeed! But the howls of protest from Britain and France rose loud and long. So loud, indeed, that the end of the eight-year period the treaty was to run, Russia reluctantly had to let it lapse.

The Crimean War needs no elaboration here. Suffice it to say that its major military objective was the destruction of the Russian naval base in the Black Sea. Its major political result was a set-back to Russia's push south. By the Treaty of Paris in 1856 the Black Sea and its littoral was made a demilitarized zone. This undid much of the work of Catherine II, Alexander I and Nicholas I. It was a major set-back, but it was not for long. The Franco-Prussian War offered the czar a chance to remilitarize the Black Sea area. Britain, of course, protested, but ended by persuading the czar to accept the remilitarization as a product of an international conference. Russia did not mind.

It was sympathy with Balkan kinsmen that led to Russia's next move. When the Bulgarians, restlessly heaving under the Ottoman domination, were threatened with dire consequences, the czar's army poured over the Pruth. Once Osman Pasha's heroic defense of Plevna had been beaten down, the Russians moved rapidly all the way down to Adrianople. With the double eagle of the czars waving over this outpost of Constantinople, the goal of centuries seemed in sight, but Czar Alexander III was moderate and insisted only on a large and free Bulgaria. Since even this was unacceptable to Great Britain, Disraeli posted off to a Berlin conference where he forced the Russians to hand back part of Bulgaria to the Turks. Why did Disraeli help the Turks? Because he feared that a large Bulgaria would be a puppet state of Russia, and so would put Russia next door to the straits. British fears about Bulgaria being a Russian puppet were about 70 years premature.

The straits question became acute in the fateful years preceding the outbreak of World War I. Russia, soundly cuffed by the Japanese, was eager to restore her tarnished prestige by gaining her age-old objective, control of Constantinople and the straits. There were two ways by which Russia could gain the straits: by diplomacy with the consent of the powers in time of peace or by force in the turmoil of a general European war. The critical years before 1914 are filled with the Russian attempt to gain the straits with the consent of the powers.

Count Izvolski, the Russian foreign minister in 1908, worked very hard to secure the needed consent. He was off to a flying start, when at Buchlau he struck his famous bargain with Baron von Aehrenthal, the Austrian foreign minister. Izvolski gave Austria Russia's consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herze-

govina (occupied by Austria since the Treaty of Berlin) in return for Austria's consent to Russian domination of the straits. Austria acted promptly to make sure of her share of the bargain, and in spite of anguished cries from Serbia, at once annexed the two districts. Count Izvolski was dismayed to find that his deal turned out to be a bargain only for Austria. For though Austria, faithful to the Buchlau deal, agreed to allow Russia to dominate the straits, Britain, even in the midst of the rapprochement which was knitting the Entente, could not bring herself to do so. Austria gained Bosnia and Herzegovina plus Serbian hatred and Russian dislike. For the Russians felt that in acting so quickly, Austria had gone beyond the bargain. Russia instead of regaining her lost prestige, saw it further diminished. She began to feel that she could not stand another Austrian diplomatic victory.

In spite of this rebuff the Russians persisted in their efforts to secure European consent to their domination of the straits. The very next year, 1910, Izvolski gained Italy's consent to look with benevolence on Russian attempts to gain the coveted waterway. But the Racconigi bargain Russia agreed to favor Italian designs on Tripoli in return for Italian good will on the straits question. Once more Izvolski was to get the bad end of a bargain, for while Italian soldiers were to swarm into Tripoli, Russia found herself as far off from her goal as ever. The Russians, indeed, moved to take advantage of Italian acquiescence. At Constantinople Russian ambassador Charykov pressed the alarmed Turks to sign a new agreement governing control of the straits along the lines of the Unkjar Iskelessi treaty. Italy according to the Racconigi bargain gave her consent. Austria according to the Buchlau bargain gave her consent. And when the young Turks in alarm and fury, turned to Germany for aid, the kaiser refused to intervene. But Russia still did not succeed. France and Great Britain gave, instead of consent, only elusive answers. Not the Triple Alliance but the Entente put the check-rein on Russian ambitions.

Izvolski was furious. He became convinced that only in a general European war would Russia be able to gain her goal. Paradoxically enough the war he desired was alongside of the powers which had blocked him and against the powers which had favored him. The general war Izvolski sought was not far off. "And when at last it suddenly burst forth (Izvolski) was said to have exclaimed exultantly: 'C'est ma guerre'."

In this war the failure of Russia to gain control of the straits was to prove disastrous. Both sides, of course, quickly realized the importance of the straits but the Liman von Sanders military mission had already given Germany a foot in the Turkish door. The cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* (trapped by the outbreak of the war in the Mediterranean) steamed into the Dardanelles to pry the door wide open. Soon under Turkish colors they were smashing Russian ships and shore installations in the Black Sea. Turkey entered the war alongside Germany and Austria-Hungary. The entrance o-

² The text of this treaty and the secret article is to be found in Emil Reich. *Select documents Illustrating Mediaeval and Modern History*, London: P. S. King and Son, 1905, 663-666. Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1947, 229-235, gives summary of all nineteenth and twentieth century conventions governing the straits.

³ Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929, 2 vols. I, 426.

(Please turn to page sixty-five)

The Beginnings of the Kulturkampf

Clarence A. Herbst, S. J.

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I AM CONVINCED that there is question here of a great Kulturkampf," Dr. Rudolph Virchow, a materialist Progressive leader, said in the Prussian Landtag January 17, 1873. In working out the electoral program for that year, he stated that his party, together with the other Liberal parties, must support the Government in a struggle "which, with every day, assumes more and more the character of a great Conflict for the Culture of Mankind." The word was meant to indicate that, if civilization were to survive in Germany, the influence of the Catholic Church must be broken. The Catholics took the name in an ironical sense, to designate a fight *against* civilization, and so it has come to be "a name given to a struggle between the Roman Catholic Church and the German government, chiefly over the latter's effort to control educational and ecclesiastical appointments in the interests of the political policy of centralization." It covered the fifteen years between 1872 and 1887, and so was already well under way when it received the name which has clung to it through history.¹

The origins of the Kulturkampf are manifold, complicated, some of them obscure, some of them reaching very far back. Perhaps I dare in one paragraph take a quick glance back over three and one-half centuries. Lutheranism broke the German states in two. In the terms of the Peace of Augsburg, 1555, Charles V acknowledged that he could not handle the Protestants and signed this compromise truce heavily in their favor. Neither the Catholics nor the Protestants were satisfied, and after much bickering came the last and greatest of the Wars of Religion, the Thirty Years' War. The settlement in Westphalia, 1648, divided the Germanies, and Europe, into two camps along religious lines for the centuries that were to follow: the North Protestant, the South Catholic. Toward the end of 350 years of confiscation and secularization of the property of the Catholic Church came two especially influential uncatholic Catholics, Joseph II and Napoleon, who did the Church in German lands no end of harm. The subservience of some among the German hierarchy even to the middle of the nineteenth century did no good. The "martyrdom" of Clemens August von Droste-Vischering, Archbishop of Mainz, for ecclesiastical liberties in 1837, was the full dawn of a new day of glory. By its just and ample provisions for religious freedom, the Prussian Constitution of 1850 struck the shackles from the Church. It was during the debates early in 1873 to change these provisions that the name Kultur-

kampf came into common use.²

The proximate causes of the Kulturkampf are elusive and hard to appreciate. But certainly at their head stands a man: Otto von Bismarck. He is continuously and powerfully at work, though not always openly. He was a Christian, but he thought an external, organized church unnecessary. He believed in God, the God of might, Who should be Bismarck's collaborator in building a powerful German State under Prussian leadership, in Whose Hand Bismarck was an instrument. Fighting Prussia needed God much, victorious Prussia needed God less. Love of country was his service of God. It is hard to analyze his position with regard to the Kulturkampf. It was shifty and even contradictory. Even the fine, contemporary judge of men and affairs, Bishop von Ketteler variously appreciates him.³ Later on, in the 80's, Bismarck himself repudiated both political and religious motives in his conflict with the Church. But whatever else, he certainly was a shrewd statesman, perhaps lucky, too, Prussian rather than German, who had no respect for the rights of others and who, when diplomacy failed, was ready "to decide the great questions of the time by iron and blood." With regard to the Catholic Church, "I consider this *ecclesia militans* a deadly enemy; it will fight Prussia as a heretical thing to the bitter end," he wrote November 25, 1853. His policy in later years ran true to this expression, however much his words might belie it. He thought the provisions for religious freedom in the new Prussian Constitution of 1850 impracticable. It was more than a coincidence that all those he considered hostile to his aim and methods: Austria, France, the Pope, the Center party, Windthorst, the South German States, the Poles, were Catholic.⁴

Bismarck's staunchest allies were the Liberals. Bennigsen's National Union of 1859 and Bluntschli's Protestant Union of 1864 joined with other elements to form the National Liberal party, which followed the principles neither of the older Liberalism nor of positive Protestantism. It was anti-Catholic and anti-Christian.

² Cf. James MacCaffrey, *History of the Catholic Church from the Renaissance to the French Revolution* (St. Louis, Herder, 1916), 2 volumes, and *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century* (St. Louis, Herder, 1910), 2 volumes, by the same author, *passim*, under the headings of the various German states. These four volumes are still the best in the field in English. Cf. Kissling, *op. cit.*, I, 1-238 for the Church in the German states from 1605 to 1860. Georges Goyau, *Bismarck et l'Eglise* (Paris, Perrin et Cie., 1911-1913), 4 volumes, I, Introduction, indicates the historical difficulties surrounding the origins of the Kulturkampf.

³ Cf. Otto Pfülf, *Bischof von Ketteler* (Mainz, Franz Kirchheim, 1899), 3 volumes, III, 164ff.

⁴ Cf. Goyau, *op. cit.*, I, 1-26. Also Heinrich Brück, *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Münster i. W., Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1902-1908), 4 volumes in 5 parts. 2 ed. (Kissling), III, 277ff. and IV, 1, 175ff.

¹ Cf. Joannes B. Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes im deutschen Reiche* (Freiburg im Breisgau, Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1911-1916), 3 volumes, I, 1.

The Liberal and Protestant press vigorously attacked the *Syllabus* of 1864. In 1865 the National German Association (Liberal) was formed to watch the progress of Ultramontanism. The press became more hostile to Rome after 1866; with the expulsion of Austria the Confederation lost 10,000,000 Catholics and was now two-thirds Protestant. The victory over Austria was declared to be a victory over the Catholics. They were the enemies of the Fatherland. The Catholic press could not silence these calumnies. When, in the next year, the old Center party disbanded, it looked indeed as though dark days had come upon the Church.⁵

The Religious Orders, being the outworks of the Church, are often the first to be attacked in any general onslaught on her. Two incidents in 1869 helped especially to stir up hostility to them.⁶ The nun Barbara Ubryk, a violent mental case, was confined in the Carmelite convent in Cracow, where she could have a doctor's care and constant attention. In the summer of 1869 the Liberal press printed, in its *Intelligenzblätter*, reports of the nun "imprisoned in a mysterious way in a cell." The authorities investigated and found the reports to be false. Of this, however, the press remained silent, allowing the false report to stand as true.⁷ Nevertheless the German journalists, meeting in Vienna, passed the following resolution July 31, 1869: "Every thinking man is in honor bound to work earnestly, by every lawful means, for the suppression of the Religious Houses, the expulsion of the Jesuits and, above all else, for the complete abrogation of the Concordat with Rome. We hope the people's parliaments in Prussia, too, will do their duty in this respect."⁸ A second incident was the Moabit affair. Four Franciscan Brothers opened an orphanage and two Dominican Fathers a chapel in Moabit, a suburb of northwestern Berlin, to take care of the numerous and poor Catholics there. On August 16, 1869, a Berlin mob attacked "the monastery", destroyed the enclosure, broke the doors and windows with stones. All the papers in the capital except the *Kreuzzeitung* approved of these excesses.⁹ This approval and the resolution of the journalists encouraged the sending of about a dozen petitions for the destruction of the Religious associations to the Reichstag. The petitions were submitted to a committee, and on December 15 it issued a report very hostile to the Orders.

At once the Catholics wanted to bring this issue up

⁵ Cf. Goyau, *op. cit.*, I, 59-76. Also Jul. Bachem, "Parteien, politische," in *Staatslexikon* (Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1901-1904), 5 volumes, IV, 367-375, and Joannes B. Kissling, *Der deutsch Protestantismus, 1817-1917*, (Münster i. W., Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1917, 1918), 2 volumes, II, 1-22.

⁶ A fair idea of why Religious Orders are attacked may be gotten from Max Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche* (Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 1896, 1897), 2 volumes, II, 227ff. Although he is speaking of Jesuits, the same, *mutatis mutandis*, could be applied to other Orders and Congregations.

⁷ So indignant was Mallinckrodt at this that when he spoke of it even two years later in the House of Representatives "the desk before which he stood quaked" an eye-witness records. Otto Pfülf, S. J., *Hermann v. Mallinckrodt* (Freiburg im Breisgau, Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1901), p. 398.

⁸ Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes*, I, 329.

⁹ Cf. Brück, *op. cit.*, III, 282ff.

in the Landtag for an airing, through leaders like Pet. Reichensperger and Mallinckrodt, but the petition was filibustered and denied and the session was closed. One must not alienate the 8,000,000 Prussian Catholics and the millions in the South German States, especially Bavaria, until, at least, as the Jew, Lasker, frankly said later, "the roof had been put over a united Empire." Bismarck moved the same way, especially since he was eager to have the Catholics behind him in the war with France which he knew must come. It came July 1, 1870. It was a quick, easy victory for the Prussians and, for Liberal and Protestant, another victory over Rome. "If they could make people believe that the Catholic priests had wished the defeat of Germany, and then establish, on the other hand, that the German victories were the victories of Protestantism, they would put Catholics outside the new Empire, and after that it would be but a matter of votes to put them outside the law."¹⁰ In the meantime, after Sedan, France had withdrawn her troops from Rome, and Victor Emmanuel's troops attacked and took the city September 20, 1870. The many petitions in behalf of Pius IX. Bismarck answered with: "For the time being, we cannot attack Italy." He tried, however, to have the Holy See bring pressure to bear on the French clergy that they might use their influence in Prussian interests and on Bavaria that it might submissively vote the treaties that would found the new Empire. Both were refused. But Prussia got a favorable peace, the South German States came in, "the roof had been put over a united Empire." Now the "internal enemy", the Catholic Church, could be taken in hand.¹²

The declaration of the dogma of papal infallibility had much to do with bringing on the Kulturkampf. On October 26, 1870, Bismarck said that "after the end of the war he would take action against Infallibility." On June 18, 1870, Count Arnim, Berlin's representative in Rome, wrote to a certain bishop, expressing his view on the situation and his fears for the future. He included a long *Promemoria*, written May 17, which in essentials surely expresses Bismarck's views and gives in detail what actually came to pass.

From the day on which the Dogma of Infallibility is proclaimed by vote or by the silent submission of the episcopacy, government as the representatives of modern political and national interests enter into a hostile relationship with the Roman Church. . . . Let no one deceive himself! The situation which shall be entered upon when the bishops, and especially the German episcopate, shall have given themselves up, is not the separation of Church and State, but war between Church and State. This war—and this is no mere hypothesis—will surely be carried on with the greatest energy when till now, the most well-intentioned efforts to safeguard peace in the interest of Christian civilization have been the rule. . . . The field on which the war will be carried on is not hard to indicate: endless strife in the election of bishops and consequent long vacancies of see, expulsion of the Jesuits, restrictions on individual freedom with regard to monastic orders, prohibition for the clergy to study in Rome and, above all, the setting aside of all ecclesiastical influences.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* For the special struggle in Bavaria, cf. Goyau, *op. cit.* I, 80-88.

¹¹ Goyau, *op. cit.*, I, 69. Already in the spring of this year 1870 party and press hostility to the Church was great and Bishop von Ketteler expressed forebodings. Cf. Pfülf, *Ketteler*, III, 145.

¹² A fine section on Bismarck and the Roman Question can be read in Goyau, *op. cit.*, I, 27-59.

the schools.¹³

But the dogma was solemnly proclaimed July 18, and on April 10, 1871, the last of the German bishops submitted. The Old Catholics, so-calling themselves because they maintained a new Church had come into existence with the definition, became anti-Infallibilists, and the enemies of the Church of Rome allied with them. Schulte, one of the Old Catholics, wrote a book December, 1870, to scare non-Catholic princes and people by the specter of the temporal power of the Pope with infallibility behind it, and in July, 1871, wrote the ministers of the various German states explaining that the infallibilist doctrine would destroy the culture and national development of the peoples. Louis II of Bavaria heaped honors on Döllinger¹⁴ and sympathized with the Old Catholics. Lutz, his Minister of Worship, sympathized with them, too. Mühler, Minister of Worship in Prussia, let professors the Church did not accept go on teaching religion in the schools.¹⁵

The Reichstag of the new Empire opened March 21, 1871. Lasker wrote for the National Liberals an answer to the Address from the Throne in which was the sentence: "The days of intervention in the internal life of other peoples will, we hope, under no pretense nor under any form, return." This was aimed at Rome. Bishop von Ketteler and August Reichensperger declared non-intervention as here formulated to be a practical impossibility. The newly-formed Center party, which had sent into the Reichstag sixty-three members as a result of the elections on March 3,

drew up a counter-schedule, which did not contain the proposition of absolute non-intervention we have just referred to, but which was nevertheless in conformity with the address of the liberals. This counter-schedule did not demand, either directly or indirectly, any intervention in favor of the Pope: it contained nothing that clashed either with the government or the other parties, and consequently was not the object of criticism in any quarter. So true is this, that the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of Augsburg, the chief organ of anti-religious liberalism, could not disguise its preference for the schedule of the Centre as to its substance as well as form. Nevertheless, though the Centre remained wholly on the defensive, and its orators exhibited the greatest moderation, a real storm of invectives was raised against them and the Church by the journalists of all the other parties and by the parliament. Even the so-called conservatives took sides against the Centre. . . .¹⁶ Its motion was voted down by a vote of 63 to 43.¹⁷

¹³ *Collectio Lacensis: Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum recentiorum, Auctoribus Presbyteris S. J. e Domo B. V. M. sine abate Conceptae ad Lacum (Friburgi Brisgoviae, Sumptibus Herder, 1870-1890), 8 volumes, VII, 1604-1607, 1604, 1605. This is really a remarkable document. Its content is indicated in Brück, op. cit., IV, 1, 33, 34, 182, 183.*

¹⁴ "But it is to be noted in Dr. Döllinger's favor that he was warmly opposed to the German Kulturkampf, and always insisted on the Catholic right to religious freedom." Arthur F. Marshall, Dr. Döllinger and the 'Old Catholics' in *The American Catholic Quarterly Review*, 15 (1890), 267-284, 273.

¹⁵ The Old Catholics, or "New Protestants," were a very strong element against the Church in the beginning of the Kulturkampf. F. Goyau op. cit., I, 135ff. An excellent contemporary sketch of them which is right to the point can be read in *Civiltà Cattolica*, V, Eighth Series (December 1871-March 1872), 279-298.

¹⁶ A. Reichensperger, "The Religious Movement in Germany, and the Fraction du Centre in the German Parliament" in *The Catholic World*, 14 (1872), 269-278, 270. This is a translation of an article written at Cologne in August, 1871, for the *Revue Générale* (Brussels). The sentence quoted from the address is given by Karl Bachem, "Kulturkampf und Maigesetzgebung," in *Staatslexikon* (Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1901-1904), 5 volumes, III, 840-899, 847.

¹⁷ Cf. Ed. Hüsgen, *Ludwig Windthorst* (Cöln, J. P. Bachem, 1911), 99.

No sooner had the German armies conquered France, and the papers announced that the German states would meet to write a constitution for a new united Germany than Bishop von Ketteler, October 1, 1870, wrote at length to Bismarck, urging that the provisions in the Prussian constitution guaranteeing religious freedom be written also into the constitution of the new Empire. He gives the reason.

When the war is over, the internal struggles which disturb our century will begin again and threaten Germany's future. . . . All these deplorable differences find no more fruitful soil than in the realm of religion. When this is left completely to the individual states, the time will not fail to come when, now here, now there, men will become very bitter because of religious differences. The discontent thus aroused will then be exploited for evil political ends.¹⁸

The Center party, of which Bishop von Ketteler had become a member, made this attitude its own, and when, on April 1, 1871, Article 2 of the new constitution was being discussed in the Reichstag, Peter Reichensperger, speaking for the Center, presented a motion, signed by forty-four of his associates, to the same effect.¹⁹ He explained that here was question not merely of the Catholic Church, nor of the Churches, but a political question of the first order, of a harmonious arrangement between Church and State that would forfend many a long and bitter conflict. Treitschke attacked the measure, saying among other things that its passage would make it possible for a bishop to become a rebel against the law of the land. Von Ketteler answered:

He (Treitschke) has asked you to give your vote to no law that might give the bishops opportunity to become "rebels against the laws of the land." I will give you a means, gentlemen, by which you will be able to avoid this danger once and for all . . . : never give your vote to laws which are rebels against the laws of God, then we shall certainly never be rebels against the laws of the land. . . .

And went on:

I consider our measure a *magna carta* of religious freedom in Germany in so far as we are able to give one. By it differences are not obliterated in the field of dogma, but by it differences are banished from political meetings. Religious peace is not to be achieved, as many believe, by separating religion from civil society nor, as others think, by attacking those who stand fast by a Christian creed. True, well-founded religious peace is to be attained rather by safeguarding perfect equality for various religious opinions and recognized faiths, for one creed as well as for another. . . .²⁰

Mallinckrodt, another leader in the Center, spoke the same day in the same strain:

I stand on the same ground with him (Dr. Löwe of the opposition) when he says there is question here not of religious unity, but of freedom. I accept that in its full measure, in the full sense of the word; I accept it not only for myself, I accept it for all my political

¹⁸ Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes*, I, 368. One may read of Bishop von Ketteler's relations with Bismarck at this time in Pfülf, *Ketteler*, III, 160-167.

¹⁹ Some of the cherished provisions from the Prussian Constitution of 1850 were: "Article 12. Freedom of religious profession, of meeting for religious societies, and of private and public practice of religion in general, is safeguarded. . . . Article 15. The Evangelical and Roman Catholic Church, as well as every other religious society, regulate and administer their affairs independently, and retain the use and ownership of their own proper institutions, foundations, and funds for worship, education, and charitable works. Article 18. The right of nomination, presentation, election, and confirmation in the filling of ecclesiastical offices, in so far as it pertains to the State and does not rest on patronage or special titles in law, is abolished." The pertinent clauses are given more fully in Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes*, I, 217, 218, whence these are taken.

²⁰ Pfülf, *Ketteler*, III, 147, 148. The abuse heaped on the great Bishop of Mainz by the press and otherwise is indicated *ibid.*, pp. 149, 150. The boys on the street even insulted him.

friends. We want freedom, freedom for every class, for every walk of life and for every race; we want freedom for the development of spiritual and material interests and endeavors—in a word we want, without hindrance, on the basis of a legislation founded with a firm hand, assured, righteous and ethical freedom for the good and the bad.²¹

Among others, August Reichensperger and Windthorst also spoke for the measure, Blankenburg and Miquel against it. That summer, when the session was over, August Reichensperger wrote: "... the proposition was opposed with extreme bitterness, even by a large majority of the Catholic deputies who did not belong to the *Fraction du Centre*. . . ."²² It was rejected 223 to 59.

It was by this time clear that the Center, though neither *de facto* nor *de jure* a religious but a truly political party, was and would continue to be a corporate, political, and public champion of religious rights and freedom in the new Germany. Heavily Catholic, disapproval by the Holy See would be a severe blow to its influence; so about the end of April rumors of disapproval began to be heard. These seemed to be confirmed by a letter written by Frankenberg, a Catholic member of the Reichstag, on May 17, 1871, and by a letter of Bismarck June 19 stating that Tauffkirchen, the German Minister in Rome, had heard disapproval expressed by Cardinal Antonelli, papal secretary of state. Meantime Bishop von Ketteler had written to Cardinal Antonelli May 28 asking for clarification and had an answer June 5 saying the report was false. Thereupon proper presentation and clarification appeared in the Center's paper *Germania*.²³

Not much more worthy of special note took place in this first session, although it might be mentioned that some hostile exchanges and remarks about clerical influence in the spring elections were made when the security came up.²⁴ The session closed June 15, 1871. It had become clear that the National Liberals had a safe majority and had allied with Bismarck. The Conservatives voted with them, too, and even some Catholic members. The Roman Curia had sustained that "black band", the Center party. The Roman Church was a danger to the State; it would not have peace. Very well; let there be war then. After insisting that the Old Catholic professors be maintained in their posts as teachers of religion in the schools,²⁵ what we may call the first official step of the Kulturkampf was taken: the suppression of the Catholic Division in the Ministry of Worship by royal decree on July 8, 1871. "The special Divisions for the affairs of the Evangelical and Catholic Churches now existing are abrogated and their work taken over by a Division for Spiritual Affairs." The Catholic Division, a consultative committee of three Catholic laymen, had been set up by Frederick William IV in 1841 so that Catholic interests might be officially represented, explained, and defended within the framework of government. But now that an organized

attack on the Catholic Church by the Government was at hand, such an official representation of Catholic interests and rights would be at least a nuisance. As was his wont, Bismarck alleged in this case, too, a patriotic reason for disturbing religious peace. It was that Krämer, the president of the Catholic Division, was in league with the hated Poles.²⁶

The first anti-Catholic law of the newly united Empire would, ironically and paradoxically enough, originate from Catholic, particularist Bavaria. There Bray, too Catholic, was replaced July 22 by Hegnenberg as head of the ministry. He would bow to Prussia. August 15 Bismarck visited Munich, and twelve days later a Bavarian decree declared that the dogma of Papal Infallibility was dangerous to the State and that no legal support would be given to disciplinary measures taken by the bishops to enforce its acceptance. The next month, September 22-24, the Old Catholic Congress met in Munich and organized its assaults against the Church in doctrine and in method.²⁷ Cries of war against Rome resounded at the meeting of the Liberal Protestants in Darmstadt October 4 and 5. At the October meeting of the Orthodox Protestants in Berlin a few days later the theme was much the same.²⁸ The second session of the Reichstag opened October 16. In the Speech from the Throne there was no mention of religion and when, on the following day, the Emperor William at length answered the Prussian bishops' complaint that at the college at Braunsburg the freedom of conscience of little Catholics was violated, he was evasive, almost threatening. October 24 Hegnenberg sent Prince Hohenlohe, vice-president of the imperial Reichstag, a draft of the penal law against preachers. Bismarck was receptive but thought Bavaria should take the lead and prepare with a press campaign. But Lutz, the Bavarian Minister of Worship, found such division of opinion even among the Liberals²⁹ in the Reichstag that he decided to take the measure to the Bundesrat. In spite of weighty arguments presented against it by Mecklenburg and Saxony, it got a favorable majority vote there November 19. This Pulpit-Paragraph (*Kanzelparagraph*, *Lex Lutziana*) ran as follows:

After §130 in the Penal Code of the German Empire the following new §130a shall be intercalated:

An ecclesiastic or other minister of religion who, in the exercise or on the occasion of the exercise of his profession, publicly, either before a crowd or in a church or any other place designated for religious gatherings, communicates news or makes comments on

²⁶ Cf. Brück, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, 88-94. Some light is thrown on this whole matter by Otto Pfülf, "Der letzte Veteran der 'Katholischen Abteilung'" in *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, 59 (1900) 121ff., 301ff., 422ff., 522ff. It is about Linhoff, who had served the Catholic Division long and well.

Three times more (Brück, *ibid.*, 94-100) the suppression of the Catholic Division came up in public debate. Mallinckrodt in a famous speech January 30, 1872, criticized its suppression. Bismarck attacked the Division in the House of Lords, March 10, 1873, and in the House of Representatives as late as January 28, 1886, both times in connection with the Polish question.

²⁷ Cf. *Civiltà*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 279-298.

²⁸ Cf. Kissling, *Der deutsche Protestantismus*, II, 106, 107. Kaiser Wilhelm honored this assembly with his presence.

²⁹ Some enlightenment on the political parties at this time, and on the operations of the German government, is given by Joseph Schroeder, D. D., "The 'Impregnable Fortress'—Prince Bismarck and the Centre Party" in *The American Catholic Quarterly Review* 15 (1890), 390-422; also in Bachem's article in the *Staatslexikon*, given in Note 5 above, the political parties are discussed.

²¹ Pfülf, *Mallinckrodt*, p. 331.

²² A. Reichensperger, *loc. cit.*, p. 271.

²³ Pfülf, *Ketteler*, III, 151-153. Cf. *Civiltà*, *loc. cit.*, 533-540 for many more details.

²⁴ Cf. Brück, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, 86-88. Even Blankenburg, no friend to Catholics, defended them on this occasion.

²⁵ Cf. Goyau, *op. cit.*, I, 166ff.

public affairs of the state in such wise as to disturb the public peace, shall be subject to imprisonment or confinement in a fortress for a period not to exceed two years.³⁰

November 23, 1871, Lutz introduced the measure for a first hearing in the Reichstag with "as hostile a speech against the Catholic Church as had ever been heard in a parliamentary assembly." He indicated that "the heart of the matter under discussion is this: who should be master in the State, the Ministry or the Roman Church." Bishop von Ketteler said the address consisted of "accusations and attacks against the Catholic Church for which not even the semblance of a proof could be offered." Peter Reichensperger gave a scathing criticism of the proposed law from a judicial point of view. Fischer from Augsburg defended it. He had no proof to offer for the abuse of the pulpit but attacked the Center and "instead of proving abuse of the pulpit spoke of abuse of the press, and instead of a penal law against the press proposed a penal law against the pulpit."³¹ Then von Ketteler spoke. He said the measure was so vague it opened the door to arbitrary action on the part of the Ministry; he called it an emergency law in the most odious sense of the word.

The second reading came November 25. Maltzahn, though hostile and prejudiced against the Catholic Church, declared himself against the measure because the statutes in the Penal Code "ought not to be changed with the changing exigencies of daily party strife." So did the Liberal Richter because, he said, persecution would only strengthen the Opposition. Schauss gave an empty declamation not to the point. Windthorst answered, now earnestly, now sarcastically:

The Representatives Fischer and Schauss have documented the necessity of the law from various Bavarian papers. It seems that the hostile gentlemen from Bavaria want to do their dirty wash in Berlin. Perhaps the waters of the Isar do not wash clean enough. I would not be able to vote for this emergency law under any condition, and earnestly beg you to reject it in the interests of public peace."³²

He proposed some amendments to improve and clarify "the nonsense" proposed for a law; for the use of that word he was called to order. The Protestant Kardorff made some irrelevant remarks about the development of dogma in the Roman Church, spiritual corporations in Germany, and the Center. Von Thorn attacked Windthorst and Bishop von Ketteler, while Kleist justified his voting for the measure by saying that, although it was a pitiful thing, it was none the less necessary. Lutz once more asserted that the Church wanted to lord it over the State. Finally the Pole Niegolewski spoke, calling it a persecution of the clergy. Then a trial vote was taken. 179 voted for, 108 against.³³

The last reading of the bill took place November 28. Von Aretim defended his Catholic fellow-Bavarians against their Liberal enemies. Lutz, he said, accused them of alliance with the revolutionary parties without producing one solid proof. Neither could Völk show a single instance in which abuse of the pulpit was judicially proved. Münster of Hannover attacked the measure as false in principle. Hertz admitted that he

could not warm up to it but wanted a victory for the Ministry and the overthrow of the Ultramontanes, Jesuits, and their friends, and so would vote for it. Then Mallinckrodt went to the real heart of the question:

Mr. Lutz says: the state has to delimit its sphere and protect it. Most assuredly! But the same most assuredly holds for the Church, too. And since when is the Church a foundation of the state? Did the Emperor Octavian, or perhaps Emperor Nero or Diocletian found the Church, or does the Church draw her authority from her divine Founder, Who sent forth His Apostles into the world and said: "Go and teach"—without a *placetum regis*? . . .

The true state of the case is this: the moral law grows out of the law of faith, and out of the moral law grows statute law. There you have the organic coordination of the Church, which is the guardian of faith and morals, and the state, which is the guardian of right order. Faith and law are very closely associated. . . .³⁴

He then harks back to Bismarck's own words in a speech given on the occasion of a debate on civil marriage in 1849: "If we go along this road . . . I hope to live to see the day when the ship of fools of our times will be wrecked on the rocks of the Christian Church." Gneist countered with an attack on Catholics, especially on the clergy and the Center. The resolution to adjourn made it impossible to answer him. The special debate followed immediately and was short. Only Canon Moufang spoke against this "hateful emergency law, this national calamity." This penal law, this first piece of Kulturkampf legislation, was passed November 28, 1871, by a large majority.³⁵ It was promulgated December 10.

Although the Kulturkampf had scarcely begun at the end of 1871, the debates over the Kanzelparagraph and the tenor of the law itself indicated clearly enough what direction the whole conflict would take in the next fifteen years. It was a question of religious freedom: of speech in this penal law of 1871, progressively in the years that followed of education and ecclesiastical government. Religious freedom is one of the fundamental rights of man; if you tamper with it, all his rights are endangered. As Erzberger said to the point for his own Germany: "The political development of our country shows that civil liberty was always the best off when religious freedom was given the people without hindrance. Without religious freedom, civil freedom in the life of the State becomes party tyranny. One who holds in high esteem religious freedom defends both civil and social liberty."³⁶ Although in the beginning the Protestants feared also for their freedom,³⁷ their fears were soon allayed, and the battle became a fight to the finish between the Catholic Church and the new Germany. Bishop von Ketteler expressed for Catholics at the end of 1871 their feelings in a letter to Countess Merwoldt: "You have taken the greatest interest in the sad news from here, beloved sister. We are now completely in the Berlin channel, and God knows what is still before us. I beg God uninterruptedly to give me the grace to bear the further kicks which are to come."³⁸

³⁴ Pfülf, *Mallinckrodt*, p. 337.

³⁵ Cf. Goyau, *op. cit.*, I, 207ff. Bismarck was absent from the discussions on the Paragraph. The indisposition which was responsible for his absence was much remarked upon in political circles.

³⁶ M. Erzberger, *Das Deutsche Zentrum* (Amsterdam, Internationalen Verlagsbuchhandlung, MESSIS, 1910), p. 22.

³⁷ Kissling, *Der deutsche Protestantismus*, II, 112, 113.

³⁸ Pfülf, *Ketteler*, III, 215.

³⁰ Text given in Kissling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes*, II, 460 (German), and in Goyau, *op. cit.*, IV, 225 (French).

³¹ Cf. Brück, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, 103-107.

³² Hüsgen, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

³³ Cf. Brück, *ibid.*, pp. 107-111.

American Historians

(Continued from page fifty-two)

will be some factor taken from man's cultural milieu, the economic system or some other social force. Or the determining control may take some form of fatalism or Calvinistic predestination. One can not escape some kind of deterministic philosophy if causality in human events is denied to man himself. And it is not enough to admit a degree of causality from man's free determination and then to ignore it in the actual explanation of human history.

The racial or Darwinian interpretation of history. The strong leaning towards a deterministic philosophy of history among American historians was sired, it would seem, by the desire to make history a physical science. This desire was best expressed by Henry Adams in his presidential address (1894) to the American Historical Association. He was convinced, he told his colleagues, that another fifty years of progress in history similar to the past half-century would raise history to the rank of a science. What was wanted was a law (or laws) of history as clear as the laws governing the material world, a law that would make the science of history as absolute as the other sciences and would fix with "mathematical certainty" the course which human society must follow.¹⁰

Henry Adams, on his own admission, was speaking under the influence of Darwin's *Origin of Species* and he was not alone in succumbing to the spell of Darwinian Socialism. In the Seventies when Adams was teaching at Harvard and in the Eighties when Herbert B. Adams was for the first time offering American students at Johns Hopkins the opportunity of graduate work in history and political science, many American historians or future professional historians accepted Darwinian Socialism with open arms and "dreamed of evolving a science of history comparable to the biological sciences."¹¹

In their enthusiasm the professors started to use the language of the biologist and chemist. "Those who believed in the evolution of social forms carried into field of the social sciences the methodology and terminology of the natural sciences."¹² Government documents were "dissected," like cats and frogs were in laboratories. History was constructed out of the chaos of original atoms. Teachers referred to their classrooms as laboratories where their students would "manipu-

late" the apparatus of history.¹³ The search for law or laws of history that would fix with mathematical certainty the path which human society must follow was on in earnest.

Actually the fruits of their search never corresponded with their early enthusiasm. There was no agreement on what the determining force casting the course of history with mathematical certainty might be. But there was general agreement that man was a piece of mechanism subject to some compelling force. Most of this group inclined toward "racial determinism." They accepted Darwinian evolution and applied the theory of the survival of the fittest to the history of nations. The ethnic factor was the *vera causa* of history. All history could be summed up in the conflict between ethnic groups: the superior and progressive peoples had Anglo-Saxon (or Aryan) blood; the inferior and retrogressive peoples were of some other racial strain. Stock, racial strain, was the decisive factor in history. And the superior, progressive peoples were entitled to world dominion. The assumption fitted in handsomely with nineteenth century Anglo-Saxon world domination, and although the application of this theory to Grant's corrupt administration proved a stumbling-block to Henry Adams, the theory found warm supporters among historians until the turn of the century.

The application of the theory of the progressive evolution of the superior racial stock from dark forests of the Germanic tribes to England and thence to the United States was obvious. The Puritans had realized that God had sifted a nation and had transplanted the best shoots to the shores of the New World. Darwin himself pointed it out. "From such a belief in the progressive evolution of society came the idea that the United States, the latest product of Western civilization, was not only the heir of its predecessors but superior to them."¹⁴

Many American thinkers became obsessed with the idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority, and the evolutionary racial school ruled the field of history with autocratic hand.¹⁵ Darwin had sired a revolution in American historiography. John Fiske, leading popularizer of Darwinian and Spencerian ideas in this country, gladly noted that:¹⁶

Since the middle of the nineteenth century the revolution which has taken place in the study of history is as great and as thorough as the similar revolution which under Mr. Darwin's guidance has been effected in the study of biology.

Though Fiske gave Darwin full credit for his many historical and philosophical writings, it was Huxley

¹⁰ Adams' address was delivered in letter form and read. It will be found in C. P. Curtis and F. Greenslet, *The Practical Cogitator or The Thinker's Anthology* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1945), pp. 125-130. Whereas Henry Adams fell under the spell of Darwin, his brother Charles was completely "revolutionized" one morning in 1865 by the reading of John Stuart Mill's essay on Comte. By that one reading he emerged, as he puts it, from the theological stage and passed into the scientific. Charles Adams was thirty years old and he confesses his intellectual faculties had been fallow for nearly four years. See *Charles Francis Adams 1835-1915 An Autobiography* (Boston's Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), p. 179.

¹¹ R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915* (Phila.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), p. 148.

¹² Edward N. Saveth, "Race and Nationalism in American Historiography," *Political Science Quarterly*, LIV (September, 1939), 423.

¹³ See letter of W. E. Foster to Herbert Adams, April 16, 1883, in W. Stull Holt, *Historical Scholarship in the United States, 1876-1901: As Revealed in the Correspondence of Herbert B. Adams* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), p. 63. Herbert Adams actually did convert a biology room into a room for history seminar at Johns Hopkins. See Michael Kraus, *A History of American History* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1937), p. 312.

¹⁴ Saveth, "Race and Nationalism in American Historiography," *op. cit.*, p. 423.

¹⁵ Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 148; Allan Nevins, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-244.

¹⁶ *Excursions of an Evolutionist* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1884), p. 194. By 1893 this book had reached the 15th edition.

who persuaded him that history was the field ripe for the exploitation of the doctrine of evolution.¹⁷

These ideas did not, of course, remain buried in seminar note books. They became the guiding philosophy in the new histories written during the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁸ John W. Burgess gave strong support to them in his writings and in his School of Political Science, founded in 1880 at Columbia University.¹⁹ John Fiske circulated them in his popular lectures. They found their way to the political platform when, after the Spanish-American War, the issue of imperialism became the great public debate. One of the most persuasive voices on the platform was Senator Albert J. Beveridge, who later made a reputation for his historical study of Chief Justice John Marshall. Pleading for the cause of imperialism and the immediate acquisition of the Philippine Islands, he reminded his listeners:²⁰

It is a mighty people that He has planted on this soil; a people sprung from the most masterful blood of history; . . . It is a glorious history our God has bestowed upon His chosen people . . . Fellow Americans, we are God's chosen people . . . His great purposes are revealed in the progress of the flag, which surpasses the intentions of Congress and Cabinets, and leads us, like a holier pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night, into situations unforeseen by finite wisdom and duties unexpected by the unprophetic heart of selfishness.

The ideas of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority were finally debated in Congress. The legislators were advised to listen to the scholars and historians who were teaching that our political institutions were the products of superior racial stock. Congressmen, lead by Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, advocated a new national immigration policy based on racial selectivity. Our political institutions, they said, can only be appreciated and protected by the same racial stock as the original colonists: Anglo-Saxons. The new immigrants from southeastern and eastern Europe were a menace to the vitality of these institutions. An immigration policy based on racial selectivity favorable to the Anglo-Saxons was dictated by logic and love of country. The legislative battle began in 1896 with Lodge advocating a literacy test for immigrants. The battle was won in 1924 with the new quota system based on racial selectivity. Long before that date most historians had abandoned Darwinian Socialism as their

¹⁷ See letter of Fiske to Darwin, April 20, 1880, in *The Letters of John Fiske* ed. by Ethel F. Fisk (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), p. 436.

¹⁸ According to Allan Nevins, Parkman and McMaster were "unconsciously" influenced by these evolutionary racial ideas, while Rhodes was consciously influenced. See *The Gateway to History*, pp. 243-244. Theodore Roosevelt's *Winning of the West* was influenced by the theory of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. See M. Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, p. 659. James K. Hosmer's *Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom* (1890) is usually selected as the model history based on racial interpretation among American historians. Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* (1872) is a good example from British literature. Bagehot's sub-title gives the clue to the work: "Thoughts on the application of the principles of natural selection to political science."

¹⁹ Burgess' major work is *Political Science and Constitutional Law* (2 vols., 1890). He admits the racial theory as the philosophy of his writings. See *Reminiscences of an American Scholar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 254-255.

²⁰ This is from his "The March of the Flag" speech given at Indianapolis in 1898. The speech may be found in *American Issues*, ed. by Willard Thorp et al (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1941), I, 913-916.

philosophy of history.²¹

Geographical interpretation of history. Historians of the Darwinian Socialist, intent on reducing history to a physical science, selected something physical within man (blood strain; racial stock) as the controlling factor in human history. Another group, equally intent on making human history a physical science and on minimizing the role of man, sought the key to history in the physical environment outside of man. Geographical factors: climate, soil, distribution of plants and animals, natural resources, diet, relief of the land, were, to the followers of this school, the controlling force in history. According to this school, "Civilization is at bottom an economic fact, at top an ethical fact. Beneath the economic lie the geographical conditions, and these in the last analysis are the factors in the formation of ethical standards."²²

Here again American historical writings were directly influenced by English ideas and writings. Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862) popularized the geographical interpretation of history. He was for all practical purposes a determinist, attempting to reduce history to a physical science and hoping to explain human history primarily in terms of geographical forces. His reputation rests on his unfinished *History of Civilization of England*, the first volume appearing in 1857, two years after Darwin's *Origin of Species*, and the second volume in 1861. The first volume of a pretentious work that promised to state the general laws of history and to exemplify them by the histories of certain nations made him famous. Henry Adams in his presidential address, already noted, links Buckle's first volume with Darwin as the source of the impulse among historians to create a science of history. And it is interesting to note that in the eight-page introduction to the *Rise of American Civilization*²³ by Charles and Mary Beard there are three approving references to Buckle. Actually, his reputation started to fade within a decade after his death, and now only rates two paragraphs in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*.²⁴

No historian can ignore the influence of geography on human history. Certain physical conditions are necessary for the existence and survival of man; he can not survive extreme heat and cold; he can not live long in a desert; life on a barren island is perilous. But the geographical factors are conditions, necessary conditions, for human life, not the cause of human activity. The application of geography to history is apparent: the early civilizations that developed on the Euphrates, Tigris and the Nile, the Roman Empire around the Mediterranean, the discovery of the New World, shifting the center of commerce from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and permitting England, an isolated island on the fringe of Europe, to become a sea power, come

²¹ For the impact of Darwin and Spencer on American thought see R. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, and M. Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, pp. 548 f.

²² Ellen Churchill Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1903), p. 281. Italics mine.

²³ (Rev. edition, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939), pp. vii, xi, xv. First printed in 1927.

²⁴ 14th ed., IV (1939), 321.

quickly to mind.

Geography has played an important role in the larger aspects of our national history. The excellent water system making for convenient colonial settlements and relatively facile communications, the Atlantic coastal plain, hemmed in by the Appalachian range, confining the colonial settlements to permanent communities; the Mississippi river and valley, the Great Lakes and the Rockies, the wonderful soil, the rich natural resources. How easily one is tempted to say that these geographical facts made the United States. Because our history lent itself to the influence of geography, some of the historians lent themselves with considerable enthusiasm to the geographical interpretation of history.²⁵ Not many, however, have accepted completely the materialistic philosophy of this school to the extreme of making geographical factors the deterministic force of history. Few American historians have succumbed as completely as the English professor, James Fairgreave, who wrote a book to show how geographical forces have controlled the world's history and which geographical forces have had the greatest influence in history. Fairgreave disposed with ease of a region or a race by geographical forces every ten pages or so, but, as he admits in the preface of his volume, he did not take into account those spiritual forces in history that were not under the dominance of the geographical.²⁶ This is a new kind of history. The tendency among American historians has been an over-emphasis and an exaggeration of the role of geographical forces on history, and, while admitting in general the influence of other factors, a culpable neglect of these other factors in explaining actual historical events.

Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947) is a good example. A geographer by profession, his name and writings have long been associated with the study of climate on civilization. Allan Nevins catalogues him as a rigid determinist: that physical surroundings and climatic influence *primarily determine* the degree of a people's civilization.²⁷ Yet he has always been careful enough to make reservations and to avoid the charge of rigid determinism. His theory, as stated in 1913, was that:²⁸

It seems to be true, as a principle, that, in the regions occupied by the ancient empires of Eurasia and northern Africa, unfavorable changes of climate have been the cause of depopulation, war, migration, the overthrow of dynasties, and the decay of civilization; while favorable changes have made it possible for nations to expand, grow strong, and develop the arts and sciences.

Yet he would admit that:

Often, unquestionably, the influence of favorable climatic environ-

²⁵ Arthur M. Schlesinger in his bibliographical note (pp. 44-46) to the chapter "Geographic Factors in American Development" in *New Viewpoints in American History* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), summarizes the influence of Buckle and the geographical school on American historiography. Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, Albert Perry Brigham, Ellen Churchill Semple, Archer Butler Hulbert, whose writings appeared during the years 1884-1905, are usually named among the prominent proponents of the geographical interpretation of history.

²⁶ *Geography and World Power* (2d ed. rev., London: University of London Press, 1921), pp. 1 and vi. This volume was first printed in 1915.

²⁷ *The Gateway to History*, p. 269.

²⁸ "Changes of Climate and History," *The American Historical Review*, XVIII (January, 1913), 223, 227, 231. Italics mine.

ment may have been completely nullified by political causes, or by personal ambitions, or other purely historical consideration, such as the discovery of a new art like the manufacture of iron, or of a new country such as America. . . . It would be possible to go with other and equally important ways in which changes may "perhaps" have co-operated with other factors in causing the decline" of nations, or in stimulating them at times when the changes were favorable.

And in his last work, *Mainsprings of Civilization*,²⁹ the fruits of his lifetime study, where he develops the theme that physical environment and heredity are the controlling factors behind the supreme fact of history, a basic evolutionary urge, he uses a sufficient number of "perhaps" and "it appears" to escape the charge of claiming exclusive jurisdiction for these factors. But it is sufficiently clear that man is minimized as a mainspring of civilization and the political, economic, religious factors reduced to insignificance.³⁰

These two philosophies of history, the geographical and the racial schools, suffer from the same fundamental defect. They attempt to explain what is really a spiritual problem—human history—in the terms and procedures and limitations of the material sciences: geography and biology. Arnold T. Toynbee dismisses them as positive factors in the rise of civilizations without ceremony or delay.³¹

Physical environment or geographical factors remain, of course, important contingencies in human history. They are important but not the controlling factors; they are conditions, frequently necessary conditions, but not, as a rule, positive factors or causes. Geographical factors are of considerable help in explaining the broad outlines of a nation's history; the physical isolation of the United States during the nineteenth century makes our foreign policy of political isolationism, in conjunction with other factors, a reasonable policy. But in explaining significant individual events or any particular administration, geographical factors falter badly. The geographer-historian much prefers to write in terms of centuries and civilizations, whereas the historian is primarily interested in significant particular events and institutions and persons such as a revolution limited in time and space, in an administration, an election, the framing and adoption of a constitution, an act of Congress, an order of the president, a decision of a court. And, lastly, man is always modifying geography. Mountains and oceans are no longer the barriers they were a few generations ago, floods are being controlled, irrigation projects are changing arid lands into rich harvests. The weather will, no doubt, continue to be man's most popular subject, but the influence of geographical factors on human history is declining.³²

Economic interpretation of history. Another and rather popular philosophy of history asserts that the

²⁹ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1945.)

³⁰ See the review of this volume by Willson H. Coates in the *American Historical Review*, LI (January, 1946), 277-278.

³¹ *A Study of History* abridgement by D. C. Somervell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 48-59 in the section on "The Geneses of Civilizations The Problem and How Not to Solve It." See also pp. 569-570.

³² The reader will find a helpful discussion of the geographical interpretation of history in Nevins, *The Gateway to History*, pp. 277-298, chapter x: "Man's Home and His History."

mode of production in the economic life of a people controls and determines the general character of the history of that people: the political, the social and religious patterns of thought and acts. This philosophy does not deny that there are non-economic forces in history: political, moral, social, and ideas, but it claims all these non-economic factors are the fruit of and are governed, determined by the economic factor. Hence, the origin of ideas, political views and institutions, social theories, moral values must be sought in the economic conditions of a society, in the method of procuring the necessary means of living, in the mode of production of food, footwear, clothing, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc. It is the philosophy of a materialist and is known as a dialectical materialism.

Karl Marx formulated the doctrine, first, in popular form and in collaboration with his friend Frederick Engels with the publication of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* in 1848; and then, for the more learned circles, in his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in 1859. This philosophy practically applied to society is Communism; accepted as a philosophy of history it is called the economic interpretation of history.

An essential part of dialectic of Marxian materialism is the economic system of collectivism, but it is much more than an economic system. It is a theory of life, a doctrine of man and society which is "complete and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world conception." It is a total explanation of human life and human activity and all human history based on the assertion that man and the whole world is material and, of course, on the complete denial of the Christian view of man and the world. There is only matter in the world. Matter is the source of everything: man, the mind, ideas, all beings and things; they are all different forms of matter in motion. And the mode of production and distribution of this world's goods determines the general character of the social, political and religious processes of life. The economic factor, the mode of production of goods, dominate and determine all human life and activities, all human events and affairs. The economic factor determines the kind of a society in which we live: ideas, legal and social system, political institutions. By necessity one pattern of society begets and yields to another: slave to feudal, feudal to capitalistic, until at last the capitalistic yields to the last and perfect society: the classless, collective society.

The economic interpretation of history found many warm supporters in American historiography. There is little doubt that the enthusiasts of this school were encouraged by Charles Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* published in 1913, the first scholarly application of the economic interpretation to American history. Here clearly the economic motive is made the controlling fact in the framing and ratification of the constitution.³³ In later years, Beard has on a number of occasions declared that the economic factor

is not the only and controlling factor.³⁴

Let me say again, as I have said all along, economic interests are not the whole of history. I have never said and do not now say that economic considerations determine or explain all history. Let that be finally and clearly understood and recognized.

Yet the fact remains that "economic interpretation developed under Beard's leadership from 1913 until the early 'thirties'."³⁵ Even the *Rise of American Civilization* (1927) is, according to Allan Nevins, "primarily an economic interpretation," although the Beards remind their readers in this work that any interpretation ignoring the political and cultural heritage of a people must of necessity be superficial.³⁶ And in 1934 Theodore Clark Smith names Charles Beard as the ablest of the professional historians who have discarded "impartiality as incompatible with a specific theory of human activity. This is the view that American history, like all history, can and must be explained in economic terms".³⁷ Unless Beard's writings have been badly misread, it is since that date that he has written as if economic interests were not the whole of history.

Not always was this interpretation made with the complete acceptance or full understanding of the implications of dialectic materialism; but the results were usually similar: the role of man was minimized, his freedom was ignored or slighted, the influence of the political, social, moral and religious factors was reduced to insignificance, the economic factor was exalted to a position of control and domination in history approaching economic determinism.³⁸ The results were also bad history.

The rejection of economic determinism in history must not be taken as a denial of the economic factor in history. Like the geographical factors, the economic can not be ignored by the historian. One of the weaknesses of early American historical writings was the slight regard, sometimes total neglect, of the economic motives of man, as if man was not under the necessity of earning a living and working for his food and shelter and as if man's political and social life and institutions were in no way affected by his economic life. The economic factor is important; it is not, however, as Beard says, the whole of history.

The three schools in one. In 1893, at the annual convention of the American Historical Association, Frederick Jackson Turner presented a new interpretation of American history: the ever retreating frontier of free land. "The true point of view in the history of this

³⁴ "Historiography and the Constitution," in *The Constitution Reconsidered*, ed. by Conyers Read (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 164.

³⁵ Howard K. Beale, "What Historians have said about the Causes of the Civil War," in *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography*, p. 89. Beard was a member of the committee that made this report.

³⁶ New edition, revised and enlarged (1939), I, 124. Nevins' comment will be found in *The Gateway to History*, p. 268.

³⁷ "The Writing of American History in America, from 1884 to 1934," *The American Historical Review*, XL (April, 1935), 447.

³⁸ James Harvey Robinson is another of the prominent historians who wrote history in terms of the economic factors as a struggle between the privileged and underprivileged groups. See his work *The New History* (1912). T. C. Smith links him with Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 447. See also, Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, p. 569.

³³ See William L. Lucey, "The Constitution is a Political Document," *The Historical Bulletin*, XXIII (November, 1944), 3-4, sq.

nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the great West." But it was not the West as we understand it today that Turner had in mind; it was the ever moving frontier, the outer edge of advance, the area between savagery and settled towns that started with the piedmont on the Atlantic coastal plain and moved westward until the Pacific was reached. It was this geographical area and its environment that furnished the forces shaping American institutions and character.³⁹

The frontier interpretation won immediate support. It was an able reaction against the narrow views of many American historians who ignored the West, had divorced the political life of the nation from the social and the economic, and had returned to the forests of Germany to discover the origins of American political institutions. But the new theory was more than a reaction against American historical writings. Turner combined aspects of the three current philosophies: racial, geographical and economic with a distinctly American but unexplored phenomenon: the frontier.

Turner was under the spell of social evolution like many of his contemporaries, borrowing more from Darwin than from Spencer. The influence of the geographical school is clear: of Buckle, Friedrich Ratzel and Albion Small; the frontier was primarily a geographical area ever shifting westward, and "the doctrine undoubtedly implies a belief that humanity is shaped by its physical environment."⁴⁰ And the frontier took on aspects of an economic force: a struggle for the necessities of existence. But it is generally agreed that Turner was no determinist; he can hardly be blamed for the extreme treatment of the frontier theory from the hands of ardent followers. But there is a strong emphasis on the influence of physical environment, geographical and economic, on man in the frontier theory, and it is this emphasis on the physical to the neglect of the non-physical factors that has elicited the judgment that the frontier hypothesis:⁴¹

appears to be nothing more than a diluted type of Marxian determinism; its foundation an unmistakable materialism, conceiving of men as the slaves of forces over which they have no control.

The frontier interpretation has been under attack for other defects and its proper place in American history is being gradually accepted. It has not replaced the importance of political ideas inherited from England.

Summary. American historians have rewritten and reinterpreted much of American history since the death of George Bancroft in 1891. The key to this interpretation has usually been some factor in the physical world or cultural milieu of man. At times, this factor has been stressed to the point that the explanation constituted a form of determinism that excluded the freedom of man as a causality in historical events. Man

himself—the subject of history—was minimized. The supernatural was ignored or denied; the word was used at the risk of one's professional standing.

It was perfectly acceptable to take one's assumptions and frames of reference from the physical sciences. It was legitimate, for instance, to borrow the assumption of the physical sciences that the laws of nature were absolutely uniform. Then one could write history on the assumption that miracles did not happen; even though the fact of a miracle is proved by the evidence of testimony like any other historical fact, one could always safely reject it on the score that it meant going "beyond the premise of nature's uniformity to include theological assumptions."⁴²

We are told that the historian is an "interpreter of the development of mankind." The physical world and cultural environment alone can not satisfactorily explain man's development. The historian can not ignore the supernatural and expect to offer a satisfactory interpretation; he can not interpret man's development while ignoring the most important fact of history: The Incarnation. The problem of history is a spiritual one, and the key to the problem is man and human nature.

"It seems to me," remarked Charles Beard, "that there are elements of determinism in history," and historians "must recognize the reality of necessity in human affairs."⁴³ True. But historians must first recognize the reason and source of this necessity. There are elements of necessity in human affairs because there are elements of necessity in man derived from his human nature. Man is an animal. He needs food, shelter, goods and services, and he is under the necessity of satisfying these wants in order to enjoy existence. Man is a social animal. He needs the assistance and company of other men in domestic and political societies. He has an intellect that is determined or necessitated to seek the true. He is under the moral necessity of doing good and avoiding evil. There are indeed considerable elements of necessity in man. That is why there are patterns of uniformity and continuity in human history. That is why there are constant modes of human activity which give considerable probability to what will happen.

But there is also an element, a very important element, of freedom in man: a freedom to determine himself. And this freedom prevents the high degree of probability derived from the elements of necessity in man from ever becoming prediction. The elements of necessity are subordinated to the element of freedom.

A few decades ago Professor Edward P. Cheney offered to his colleagues what he considered the "laws" of history. He, like many other historians, was anxious to discover the laws of history, for:⁴⁴

If the laws that control human history can really be discovered and formulated, the service to mankind will be far greater than that of the discovery of physical and psychological or even biological law. For one of the prime characteristics of law is that it is

³⁹ The address called "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" was printed in the *Annual Reports of the Association* (1893). This paper and three other essays written in the early nineties and presenting his new interpretation will be found in *The Early Writings of Frederick Jackson Turner: With a List of All His Works* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1938).

⁴⁰ J. C. Almack, "The Shibboleth of the Frontier," *The Historical Outlook*, XVI (March, 1925), 198; *Theory and Practice in Historical Study*, pp. 46-47.

⁴¹ Almack, *op. cit.*, 198.

⁴² Homer C. Hockett, in a review of G. J. Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method in American Historical Review*, LII (July, 1947), 764.

⁴³ "Historiography and the Constitution," *op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁴⁴ "Law in History," *American Historical Review*, XXIX (January, 1924), 246-247.

invariable. It acts in the present and will act in the future as it has in the past, and mankind sadly needs a guide for action in the present and in the future.

Observing the past with care, weighing and measuring and setting all in true perspective, Cheney concluded that:⁴⁵

the personal, the causal, the individual in history sinks in significance, and great cyclical forces loom up. Events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena but voluntary human effort. . . . So arises the conception of *law in history*. History, the great course of human affairs, has been the result not of voluntary action on the part of individuals or groups of individuals, much less of chance; but has been subject to law. . . . Men have on the whole played the parts assigned to them; they have not written the play.

Cheney formulated six general laws which, to the best of his ability, would explain why events come of themselves. First,⁴⁶

a law of continuity; second, a law of impermanence; third, a law of unity of race, of interdependence among all its members; fourth, a law of democracy; fifth, a law of freedom; sixth, a law of moral progress.

Although the meaning of each law is explained, no explanation of the origin of the laws is proffered, no hint of a lawmaker, no indication that these "laws" are constant modes of human activity derived from the natural tendencies and necessities of human nature. Such an inquiry would lead to the ultimate source of the "laws," to a lawmaker, to the supernatural, to the "end" of man, to the ultimate meaning of history.

History "is not like the weather. It is not meaningless."⁴⁷ At the bottom of all history and historical problems is the problem of man. The meaning and purpose of human activity and of human history will be found in the nature and purpose of man.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁴⁷ James Truslow Adams, "My Methods as a Historian," *op. cit.*, p. 777.

The Straits Problem

(Continued from page fifty-four)

Turkey into the war severed one of Russia's most important lines of communication. Britain and France could not get Ukraine wheat. Russia could not get enough of the Anglo-French munitions and materiel she so desperately needed. The closure of the straits lengthened the war and contributed to the fall of the Russian Empire.

The Allies realized the importance of opening the straits, and no one more than Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. In 1915 British warships banged away at Turkish forts in an attempt to blast the straits open by naval action. This failed. And in spite of Anzac gallantry, so did the attempt to open the straits by way of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The straits remained closed, but the British attempt to open them had interesting diplomatic repercussions. Russia had viewed the British move with mixed emotions. The Russian high command wanted the straits open, but the Russian foreign office was afraid that if the British opened the straits, the British would, in one way or another, plant themselves permanently on this waterway so vital to Russia. The foreign office was quick to manifest this alarm. Foreign Minister

Sazonov first demanded that the job should be done by an all-Russian force, but in this he was speedily overruled by the hard-pressed military men who wanted a diversion and wanted it right away. At this juncture the Greeks became interested, and let it be known that they might come into the war and participate in a campaign to open the straits. Russia promptly informed Athens that Greek collaboration was not desired "for the taking of this city".⁴ "The emperor," M. Sazonoff added, 'had in an audience with him yesterday declared he could not in any circumstances consent to Greek cooperation in the Dardanelles.' This was a hard saying. Was there no finger to write upon the wall, was there no ancestral spirit to conjure up before this unfortunate prince, the downfall of his house, the ruin of his people—the bloody cellar of Ekaterinburg?"⁵

The Dardanelles campaign spurred Russian diplomats into intense activity. With British battleships in the very straits, the Russians realized that they must act with vigor and speed if they were to gain their dearest goal. On March 4, 1915, in a memorandum to the British and French ambassadors, Foreign Minister Sazonov made it very clear what Russia wanted. Russia wanted the left bank of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, part of Thrace, and all the islands controlling the straits. In return Russia would look with benevolence on any little desires the British and French might have elsewhere. Britain and France tried to continue the elusive tactics which had already spoiled the Buchlau bargain and the Racconigi agreement for the Russians. But with the scent of the long desired prize in his nostrils, the Russian bear was not to be put off this time with evasive answers. And this time Britain and France needed Russia.

The British were the first to give in. The historic words which reversed age-old policy were in a memorandum for the British embassy.

"If the war ends in a triumphant conclusion, and if the aspirations of Great Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire as well as in other regions are realized as expressed in the Russian communication . . . the government of his majesty will give its consent to what is exposed in the memorandum of the imperial government on the subject of Constantinople and the straits."⁶

When on April 10, 1915, the French finally followed their British allies, Russia could well exult; for the prize so long desired was in her grasp. At the end of the war the czar could move into the city of the emperors. But by the end of the war, the czar was dead, the empire a thing of the past. The Bolshevik revolution had cost Russia her age-old goal. As she lifted the cup of success to her lips, a little man named Lenin struck it from her hands.

Since the Reds pulled Russia out of the war, they forfeited all claims to Constantinople. This gave the Allies a chance for a new deal. The partition of the Ottoman Empire had been attended to in the Sikes-

⁴ Dragoumis to Athens, cited in Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931, 44.

⁵ Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931, 385-386.

⁶ Memorandum of the British Embassy cited in Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey*, 130.

Picot and St. Jean de Maurienne agreements. The prize reserved for Russia, Constantinople and the straits, was now derelict. The Turks helped to solve the problem by refusing to stay dead. Kemal's rejuvenated army drove the Greeks out of Asia and bearded the war-weary British. The result was that the treaty of Sevres was jettisoned to make way for the treaty of Lausanne, in 1922. By this treaty Turkey regained control of the straits, but she was forbidden to fortify them and was compelled to allow free navigation of these strategic waterways. This regime lasted until 1936 when the powers assembled at Montreux granted Turkey permission to fortify the straits. Among these powers agreeing to the revision of the Lausanne treaty was Soviet Russia, although Maxim Litvinov complained that it did not afford sufficient protection to the Black Sea powers.

It was not until Hitler plunged Europe into the turmoil of World War II that Soviet Russia felt strong enough to take up the czar's burden and resume the push towards the straits. The story is really current events rather than history, but to round off the historical background, and to show how important the straits may be in the future, here is a brief summary of the Soviet maneuvers.

As early as September, 1939, Russia is believed to have demanded bases on the straits from Turkey. Then when the great dictators, Hitler and Stalin, were balancing the world between them, Stalin demanded bases in the straits. Hitler refused Stalin as Napoleon had refused Stalin's predecessor, Czar Alexander I. After the war the victorious Russians strove to wrest control of the straits from the badly frightened Turks. Already at Potsdam it had been agreed that a revision of the Montreux convention was in order, but there seemed to be a profound difference of opinion between the Britain and the United States and the Soviet Union as to the form this revision should take. The Russians then tried another tack by accusing the Turks of failure to live up to the Montreux agreement, and demanding a completely new regime for the straits. The Turks refused, and defended themselves against the charge of violating the Montreux agreement. This brought Great Britain and the United States into the controversy, and soon diplomatic notes were flying back and forth at a great rate. The controversy came to an end with the United States and Britain holding the line against Soviet demands for control of the straits.

The British position is well summarized by Foreign Minister Bevin.

"At the various international conferences during the last three or four years, and in their latest correspondence with the Turkish Government, the Soviet Government has made it clear that they are anxious to obtain a base in the straits, which would ensure, in effect, that the control of this waterway would rest in the hands of the Soviet Union and not in the hands of the territorial power most clearly concerned. His majesty's government have made it clear that in their view, if this were adopted, it would involve an unwarrantable interference with the sovereignty of Turkey, and the effect of it would be to put her really under foreign domination, and would also represent an improper interference with the rights of other powers concerned . . . I repeat that his majesty's government do not dispute that the existing convention requires modification in certain respects to bring it into accord with present-day conditions . . . But, while recognizing that revision is necessary, his majesty's government is very anxious to keep the international aspect of this waterway always in view."⁷

The United States held practically the same position, and Walter B. Smith, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union, made it plain to Moscow:

"My government . . . feels that it would be lacking in frankness if it should fail to point out again at this time, in the most friendly spirit, that in its opinion the Government of Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the straits and that should the straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations."⁸

The historical background of the straits has a peculiar interest, because here the old cliché about history repeating itself seems strangely fulfilled. Although the swift progress of scientific warfare might well deprive the straits of much of their strategic importance, the Russian attempt to control them has persisted. Once more Russia looks with greedy eyes on the long-coveted waterways. Once more Britain holds up a restraining hand. And this time back of Great Britain stands the United States.

⁷ *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard). House of Commons. Official Report, vol. 427, No. 201, Oct. 22, 1946, cols. 1500-1502, cited Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, 43-44.

⁸ The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 9, 1946, Harry N. Howard, *Op. Cit.*, 59.

Book Reviews

Chapters in Western Civilization, selected and edited by The Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College, Columbia University. New York. Columbia University Press. 1948. 2 vols. pp. ix, 437; 299. \$2.50 each volume

History students ordinarily obtain their information from three sources: (a) bare factual material, presented in either chronological or topical arrangement

without interpretation by the author; (b) reading in "primary sources"; (c) interpretative essays on historical topics. The tendency in recent decades has been to offer the student a handbook containing the bare factual material, and to have him supplement it with assigned readings from "prime sources".

This method has its good points, but it still leaves the student to perform the most difficult task of the

historian: to interpret the subject matter from which the story of history is made. Few students can do this. The twenty essays of these two volumes are designed to help the student—and his instructor as well—in this difficult task.

The subjects are well chosen: economic, cultural, religious, and intellectual topics, which need interpretation most sorely, are stressed at the expense of the more prosaic political and military subjects. Such a selection of topics naturally lays stress on subjects in the Renaissance-Reformation era and in the period since the French Revolution. The essays are occasionally selections from well-known works, for example, two chapters from John H. Randall's *Making of the Modern Mind*. Most of the essays, however, are written especially for the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia College or for these two volumes.

No two historians can be expected to select the same twenty subjects as most deserving of treatment. Many would like to see chapters on Cartesianism and on Freudianism. But no one is likely to object to the selection made by the editors of these two volumes. Some of the essays are brilliant, some are rather superficial, all of them are provocative. No historian is likely to agree with all the interpretations offered, but every student capable of discerning, critical reading can profit from using them.

THOMAS P. NEILL.

The Knight Errant of Assisi, by Hilarin Felder, O.F.M. Cap. (trans. by Berchmans Bittle, O.F.M. Cap.) Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co. 1948. pp. xii, 152. \$2.50

Much has been written about the *Poverello* but so vibrant was the life of this simple man that new facets of his life continually lend themselves to historical and hagiographical treatment. In his present work the noted Franciscan scholar, Bishop Hilarin Felder, places emphasis upon the knighthood of St. Francis. The idea is far from being novel, for the earliest biographers constantly styled the founder of their Order as "the new knight of Christ", "the most valiant knight of Christ", "the soldier of Christ", "the new champion of Christ" and "invincible leader and captain of the knights of Christ".

Bishop Felder demonstrates that these were not merely titles bestowed upon St. Francis, but that the age of chivalry definitely influenced the life and actions of the saint. His early life was spent in preparation for the splendors and the great deeds of the knightly class, and his greatest ambition was to be admitted into the ranks of knighthood. When, at the age of 23, he turned his back upon the goods of the world, his knightly ambitions remained, but it was to be a spiritual knighthood. Francis became "liege man of Christ who for us was crucified", and like every knight he courted and loved his lady love, Lady Poverty. Since the ideal of chivalry demanded joyfulness as the first requisite of Christian knighthood, St. Francis became the troubadour and minstrel of God, composing verses and canticles in honor of his Divine Liege Lord, of the Blessed Virgin and of Lady Poverty.

Bishop Felder's treatment of St. Francis as a son of the age of chivalry is a welcome contribution to the rich fund of Franciscana already in existence. Viewed against the background of his own times, the *Poverello's* life and actions became more understandable and yet more wonderful.

ANTHONY F. CZAJKOWSKI.

The Great Transformation, by Karl Polanyi. New York and Toronto. Rinehart and Company. 1947. pp. xiii, 305. \$2.50

Karl Polanyi is a liberal writer. His work on the nineteenth century, in which "the great transformation" occurred, is therefore naturally critical of that age's economic institutions and practices. Naturally, also, his work is concerned almost exclusively with things economic; for to the liberal today it is in the field of economics that man is to seek his salvation and right his course from the errors of the "liberals" of the nineteenth century.

The thesis of the book is that a unique society came into being in the nineteenth century—a society determined by the self-regulating market, to which both nature and man were subjected when land and labor were made mere commodities. This society, the author rightly insists, enslaved man and caused him instinctively to throw up certain protections against the enslaving market economy. In this way did such things as social insurance, the New Deal, and eventually Hitler and Mussolini come about.

Mr. Polanyi is possessed of a penetrating intellect, and in this work he sheds light on the social ramifications of economic institutions in the nineteenth century when the important people of the age seemed to make Marx's economic determinism an adequate explanation of their behavior. The "great transformation" consisted in the creation of a market economy, with its balance-of-power system, its international gold standard, and the liberal state, "in the exploitation of the physical strength of the worker, the destruction of family life, the devastation of neighborhoods, the denudation of forests, the pollution of rivers, the deterioration of craft standards, the disruption of folkways, and the general degradation of existence."

This book makes a strong and penetrating criticism of nineteenth century institutions, and it is helpful to the mature student of the period in showing the importance of such institutions as the international currency exchange. But the reader cannot help feeling that Mr. Polanyi does not probe as deeply as he thinks he does; for something had happened in men's minds and souls in the eighteenth century to make possible this "great transformation" of the nineteenth. The market economy is every bit as vicious as Mr. Polanyi says it is, but it is not the basic factor he makes it out in his book. Pivotal it was, no doubt, but the basic transformation had taken place within man—and this is a transformation the author tends to ignore, and by ignoring it he implicitly denies it in this work which is otherwise quite penetrating and informing.

THOMAS P. NEILL.

The City and the Cathedral, by Robert Gordon Anderson. New York and Toronto. Longmans, Green and Co. 1948. pp. xii, 337. \$3.50

The busy pen of Robert Gordon Anderson has brought forth another book which is aimed at popularizing and humanizing history. As a supplement to his *Biography of a Cathedral*, which presented the earlier Middle Ages, the author focuses his attention upon the Paris of the thirteenth century, the century which James J. Walsh has called "the greatest of centuries". His work is therefore, as the sub-title proclaims, a reflection of the glory of the Gothic and the Middle Ages at their high tide in the city by the Seine.

From the opening lines it is evident that the author is enamored with the city of Paris and with the medieval period. The central point of attraction is the Cathedral of Notre Dame, which was not only the soul of Paris but also the top crest of the mighty tides of the Gothic Age. This sanctuary of peace "built up in the form of that Cross represents something that cuts ruthlessly, magnificently across the whole life of Paris and the whole life of man". Here man has reached his greatest height, in his reaching out toward God.

The author develops his story by a series of graphic descriptions of the leading personalities and types that lived, worked and died within the shadows of Notre Dame. The reader is taken on a leisurely journey through the various decades of the century, and with the guidance of a vivid historical imagination he is introduced to many personages. In the pages of the book he meets Blanche of Castille arriving in France at the age of twelve to become queen, becomes acquainted with the saintly Louis IX, attends the knightly preparations of the royal son, walks up the narrow streets to the university and peeks over the shoulder of St. Thomas Aquinas to see what he is reading and writing. Under the skillful and imaginative pen of Robert Gordon Anderson the thirteenth century, with its ideals and personalities, becomes a living reality.

It would be well if this book found its way not only into the hands of students of history, but especially into the possession of those who consider the words "medieval" and "feudal" to be self-explanatory as typifying ignorance, brutality, superstition and enslavement. Perhaps even they might agree with the author that "something was lost to man when, in the New World, he let his towers of commerce surpass those of God".

ANTHONY F. CZAJKOWSKI.

Nicolaus of Autrecourt, by Julius Rudolph Weinberg. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1948. pp. 242. \$3.75

In presenting the thought of Nicolaus of Autrecourt—a rather obscure fourteenth century scholastic who disagreed completely with the philosophical doctrines of Aristotle—Mr. Weinberg has a very curious notion in his head. He states in his introduction that the defense of Aristotle has currently rested on the assumption that the modern temper is incapable of understanding Aristotle and therefore all efforts at criticizing him fall to the ground. Hence Mr. Weinberg, who seems to take seriously this unbelievably simple apologetic, offers

us a fourteenth century man who, *a pari*, must have been capable of understanding Aristotle because he lived in "a climate of opinion" that was intemperately Aristotelian; all that is necessary then is to allow Nicolaus' arguments (fourteenth century) to speak for themselves and we shall see a beautiful refutation of Aristotle.

The book is seriously prepared, but it is impossible to take it as a serious book because Nicolaus' obscurantism is so wholly swallowed. Nicolaus had an obscurantist interest in destroying philosophy in behalf, he thought in some dark way, of theology and morals; and the only reason why Mr. Weinberg takes Nicolaus seriously is that he, apparently, has at heart an obscurantism somewhat more obscure than Nicolaus'. Like David Hume, whom Mr. Weinberg mentions as the intellectual heir of Nicolaus, Mr. Weinberg does not see that the impossibility of science knowing *what* are the ultimate reasons in the universe does not imply that there *aren't* ultimate reasons. Indeed if science—and all the great scientists are agreed on this—were not approximating the ultimate reasons in the universe as a limit (which however is never reached) her temporary and incomplete findings would have no intelligibility whatever and the whole scientific effort would have no sense. Mr. Weinberg seems to be wanting to do for science what Nicolaus did in regard to philosophy—render it hopelessly impossible. The case against Hume is not, as Mr. Weinberg would have Hume's critics say, the silly one that Hume's "climate of opinion" prevented him from understanding Aristotle; the case against Hume is simply that he is demonstrably replete with intellectual frauds and deceptions. As for Nicolaus, the case against him is simply his complete failure to understand the difference between formal and material logic—a matter with which it is hard to see what the fact of his having lived in the fourteenth century has to do.

CHARLES N. R. MCCOY.

The Far East Since 1500, by Paul E. Eckel. New York. Harcourt Brace and Company, 1947. pp. xv, 820. \$5.00

This volume seeks to present for the college student and for the general reader not only the political, economic and diplomatic phases of Far Eastern history, but also the social, cultural and intellectual aspects. Since the field of study is so comprehensive, the author has divided his work into two parts. Part one rapidly surveys the four hundred years of political, economic and social intercourse among the nations of the Far East and tells of the coming of the white man with his attempts at economic and political penetration. Part two presents a detailed account of Eastern Asia in the twentieth century. Here the author attempts to maintain a balance in the emphasis on nationalism, democracy, military fascism and communism on the one hand, and the industrial and commercial developments, imperialism and the two world wars on the other.

In presenting the story of the white man's advent to eastern Asia, the book is very critical of the methods employed by the westerners. The Catholic missionaries, for instance, are presented as advance agents of

conomic and imperialistic penetration into new lands and as such often incurring the anger of the ruling dynasties. In general the leading European powers were interested only in economic exploitation; the United States alone emerges as the champion of Far Eastern interests.

For the general reader the most interesting portion of the book is the story of the emergence of modern Japan and China. After its forceful entrance into world affairs, Japan quickly learned the lessons of western democracy and put this knowledge to good use, especially in World War I. The gains obtained from that war spurred the chauvinistic militarists and nationalists upon a program of expansion over the entire Far East which led eventually to Pearl Harbor and to involvement in World War II.

China, on the other hand, presents a dismal picture of disunity, civil war and foreign interference. Even the revolution of 1911 failed to bring a solution to her problems. The transition from centuries' old customs and methods to modern government and industry caused great dislocation. In China, as everywhere in the Far East, the coming of the industrial revolution created the same problems which western Europe had to solve in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These problems of inflation, unemployment and slums were further aggravated by the long series of civil wars, first among the war lords and later between the Kuomintang and the communists, and finally by the long exhausting war against the Japanese.

In his treatment of China, the author is very severe on the regime of Chang Kai-Shek and his one-party rule. By way of contrast, the communists are presented as being interested merely in agrarian and economic reform for the Chinese people and in greater democratic participation in the government. Hence the present civil war, according to the author, is merely an internal affair, with the communists as one faction fighting against another faction. It is probably more accurate to view the Chinese civil war as an extension of the Soviet expansionist policy, continuing Tsarist Asiatic ambitions and finding fertile ground for action in the complicated, political and social problems of the war-ravaged country.

The author is also critical of the impasse in post-war Korea and of the attempts by the American Army to rebuild the country. He lays the blame for lack of American and Russian co-operation upon the methods utilized rather than on long-range aims of the two occupying powers. The reviewer wonders whether the author would today repeat what he has included in his book, "In a very real sense Korea has become a testing ground for the American and Russian versions of democracy. All attempts of the two occupying governments to co-operate in setting up a provisional democratic regime have failed." The author himself notes that the Soviets intend to follow a course in Korea that in Eastern and Central Europe, that is, to establish a friendly government. The history of Eastern Europe, as most recently exemplified by the case of Czechoslovakia, indicates that a friendly govern-

ment must perforce be a communist government, under whatever title it might be disguised.

The author might have been on safer historical grounds had he completed his survey with the termination of hostilities in 1945, for events since then are still too recent to admit of clear, objective treatment. However, the book is recommended for the student of the Far East and for the general reader, because of its lucid and thorough presentation of the complicated story of the Far East. The author has the happy faculty of compressing much detail into a condensed and readable form. Whereas most books on Asia suffer from a super-abundance of oriental names, most of them meaningless to the average Occidental, the present author has avoided this pit-fall and has managed to keep his story clear as well as concise. The book, moreover, contains excellent bibliographical notices and a complete index, which will serve as useful guides for further study of the Far East.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI.

Essays on Freedom and Power, by Lord Acton, selected and with an introduction by Gertrude Himmelfarb. Glencoe, Illinois. The Free Press. 1948. pp. lxvi, 452. \$5.00

It is good to have a new edition of these important essays by Lord Acton—good because they deal with fundamental problems of human beings in society. The learned Acton thought deeply, and though his writing is sometimes not as lucid as the reader might desire, nevertheless his essays deserve serious pondering by those who seek to explain the meaning of history.

Unfortunately, the long introduction is written by one whose close study of Lord Acton seems to have done little toward making her an objective analyst of Acton's Victorian setting. Miss Himmelfarb—either through animus or ignorance—distorts the issues drawn between Rome and the English historian. The only colors with which she works are black and white, and Rome is plain black, whereas Lamennais, Döllinger and Acton are pure white. She shows herself a little disappointed in her hero for his failing to follow Döllinger out of the Church.

The book includes a thorough Acton bibliography.

Despite the poor analysis made by the editor, *Essays on Freedom and Power* is still a valuable volume. Acton remains too big a figure in the history of history-writing to be badly hurt by the introduction to this volume of his essays.

THOMAS P. NEILL.

Francis Lieber, by Frank Freider. Baton Rouge. Louisiana State University Press. 1948. pp. 445. \$4.50

This Life of Francis Lieber is a captivating story very nicely told and eminently readable. The author has a nice touch for graphic incident which is used very effectively from the episode in Niebuhr's Roman drawing-room, where the disillusioned romantic was returning from the Greek war, clad in borrowed breeches that were too short to reach his socks, to Abraham Lincoln receiving an honorary degree from Columbia University in his shirt sleeves.

The story is attractive despite unprepossessing traits in its leading character. Lieber was hopelessly conceited, an incurable climber; "carefully the opportunistic scholar renewed or made other acquaintances he thought might be of value"; and in spite of his undoubted intellectual gifts he was not above minor misrepresentations which might serve his advancement, a "compliant creed."

The story concerns a young man born and raised in the first phase of Prussian nationalism, a private in the Prussian army in the last Napoleonic campaigns, a student of Schleiermacher, an early radical hounded by the Prussian secret police, a refugee to America; it narrates his sojourn of twenty years in a small Southern college after a turn as a swimming instructor and his final achievement of a professorship at newly organized Columbia University. Through this runs the story of the transformation of the ardent young radical who ran off to the Greek Revolution, to the Union professor who submitted his "propositions to the Union League Club which adopted them by acclamation."

Lieber as a philosopher, in the sense of a metaphysician, probably does not deserve the place he accorded himself at an early age as the equal of De Tocqueville and Montesquieu. However, in the intellectual field in which he finally landed, a sort of ethics mixed with practical politics, his final conclusions seem to be on the whole sound and remarkably penetrating. In particular, he grasped the difference between English democracy with its medieval roots and French revolutionary democracy with its tendency to totalitarianism at a time when few Americans had equal penetration. In 1851, he stated with amazing foresight, speaking of the extreme despotism in Russia, "this will create ultimately a convulsive exposition and give for a time fearful power to Communism, Socialism and all sorts of French democratic absolutism." His ideas about "institutions" are peculiarly sound (pp. 268 sq.) and he foresaw the twentieth century dictators and wrote against "those who follow the French view and who strive above all for union of force"—which by a logical progression would bring them to the support of—"a democratic Caesar."

With such insight into the making of modern Europe and his distrust of "Gallican democracy," his violent attitude toward the Catholic Church is curious, since the same things in the Gallican tradition have been a burden to the Church for six centuries. But somehow he managed to identify, as the best Frenchmen do, France and the Church.

Lieber's cultivation of the influential may bespeak an unattractive personality, but it gives the author a wealth of interesting people and interesting anecdotes to write about. There were Niebuhr and Schleiermacher and Von Ranke in the first phase; George Grote, Henry Brougham and young Stuart Mill and Sarah Austin in the brief British phase; almost every influential living American throughout the mid-nineteenth century—the Careys in Philadelphia, Ticknor, Bancroft, the Longfellowes, Kent and Story, Everett (first American to receive the German Ph. D.); John C. Calhoun,

Hayne, Petigru, McCord, Bishop England, Rhett Cheves and Hammond in the South, Charles Sumner, Henry Clay; and in the last phase of his life in New York, all the influential Northern leaders from Lincoln down to Peter Cooper, on whose advice he came to New York, and the devious Barnard. This last named deprived him of his professorship in the college, but could not keep the even more devious Lieber out of the Law School where he taught fewer hours at the same salary.

This is a type of historical biography of the near great which the English have cultivated very successfully. When neatly done, as this volume is, it contributes immeasurably to our understanding of our own country and cannot be sufficiently encouraged.

B. W. DEMPSEY.

Introduction to Research in American History, by Homer C. Hockett. New York. Macmillan. 1948. pp. xiv, 179. \$3.00

History Methods and Interpretation, by William L. Lucey, S. J. Worcester, Mass. College of the Holy Cross. 1948. pp. 93.

There are few teachers of American History who must direct theses and dissertations in the field who have not referred students to Hockett's little *Introduction to Research in American History*. It is a standard work, most useful and practical. This is the second edition, a surprising fact since the book has such wide usage. For those who need it and use it, the book needs no recommendation. It may be doubted that any research student in the field of American History does not know it. A new edition is to be welcomed. Perhaps the best commendation to be offered for the book is that with it at hand the problem of government documents, their place of depository, how to use and quote them—all of these are explained clearly and in detail. Hence this reviewer rejoices that a new edition is on the market.

Father William L. Lucey's pamphlet is intended to be a small edition of a book on historical method for history majors on the under-graduate level. The little paper-bound book is clearly written and quite satisfactory for its purpose. What is remarkable about the production is that its author felt such a work necessary. That fact is in itself very indicative of the high standard of the work done by the Department of History at Holy Cross College. Most such departments are satisfied to pour their undergraduates into the hopper of courses and simply hope for the best. Evidently Father Lucey disagrees with such a loose manner of teaching. His book is excellent for its purpose.

JOSEPH P. DONNELLY.

Seven by Chance: the Accidental Presidents, by Peter R. Levin. New York. Farrar, Straus & So. 1948. pp. vi, 374.

This is the first full-length book published by Mr. Levin, who was formerly a graduate student at the University of Chicago. The author poses serious questions about presidential succession in the United States;

at he is much more concerned here with bringing together, in a single volume, the lives and administrations of the seven vice-presidents who succeeded to the presidency "by chance".

Mr. Levin makes little pretense to extensive use of new or original sources—he is content to assemble and interpret. This he does exceedingly well, with remarkable insight particularly into personality and practical political factors.

Most readers of this book will rush to the chapters on Harry S. Truman, and some will chuckle, when they think back to November, 1948, at the remark that one of Mr. Truman's most serious weaknesses is his "inability to lead public opinion" (p. 358). But this book was written when the pollsters still held the respect of most Americans—including most shrewd politicians and objective scholars.

The analyses of the Truman Administration to the time of publication, as well as of the experiences of presidents Tyler, Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt and Calvin Coolidge are, for the most part, reasonably objective political analyses, showing a degree of judiciousness, and are sprinkled generously with epigrams.

This volume was written for popular consumption, and the style, for that purpose, is good, though the author does effervesce too frequently as, at page 149: "... out in the verdent stretches of the pasture flourished a second group, more dangerous than the reformers because it traded not in intellect but in jobs, because it sought not honesty in politics but power . . ."; or, in describing the 1920's: "For the moment, a fanatically righteous prohibitionism succeeded in equating the moderate beer drinker and the chronic alcoholic as moral degenerates" (p. 233).

A suggestive bibliography and a useful index of the persons mentioned adds to the usefulness of the book. Though a number of suggestions for change in the position of the vice-president are made by the author, a clue to his findings after a careful study of the seven administrations may be found in the book's concluding sentence: "Perhaps it is not too much to ask that the electorate follow with more attention those it elects as its agents."

H. G. MELLMAN.

Fernando Wood of New York, by Samuel Augustus Pleasants. New York. Columbia University Press. 1948. pp. 216.

Fortunately for the American people, Fernando Wood (1812-1881) was never able to extend his political influence much beyond the limits of the city of New York. As an important leader in the Democratic Party, New York's mayor for three terms, and as a member of Congress for almost twenty years, he did play an important role in the development of the worst in the American political tradition.

In both his private and public life he was a person of unquestioned charm, talents, and ambitions, but of almost no scruples and little conscience. In brief, he was one of the most corrupt politicians who ever stole

his way into public office and, as a party and civic leader, helped pave the way for such blots as the notorious "Boss" Tweed. Mr. Pleasants, in this volume, suggests that Wood had virtues which deserve public attention; but this book itself changes no generally accepted notions about the subject of the biography.

According to one story, possibly apocryphal, Fernando Wood was named by his mother after the hero of a lurid novel she had been reading just before his birth. In his first "official" contact with government, at the age of 24, during an argument with a Pennsylvania State Senator, Wood defended himself with a chair against the solon's advances with a bowie knife. Perhaps he learned something from this encounter, for rarely afterwards was he to allow himself to be placed on the defensive.

A failure in his first business venture, a "Wine and Segar" store, he tried managing a tobacco factory and then started a grocery and grog shop near the New York waterfront. This led him very quickly to success as a ship-owner and real estate operator in his adopted city and in the newly prosperous San Francisco.

Still in his 30's, he was now able to return to active participation in the Democratic Party, to begin to use Tammany Hall to his advantage, to break from it and form his own "Mozart Hall" when necessary, and to weld together a personal machine whose viciousness is forgotten today only because it was overshadowed a few years later by Tweed's version of the same thing.

On the way to power and success, Wood seems to have cheated a bank which, through a bookkeeping error, had deposited \$1,750 to his account; and he narrowly escaped indictment for defrauding a brother-in-law who did manage to recover \$15,000 by a civil suit. As mayor and congressman, Wood dipped freely into funds available to him from firms interested in contracts, franchises, and other favors, and was not averse to giving generous assistance to even the most vicious groups (like the nativist, racist "Know-Nothing" party) when their votes could help him. At the age of 48, during the year after his wife's death, he found time from his duties as mayor to court successfully the sixteen-year-old daughter of a wealthy, socially prominent broker, bringing to himself a bride who had spent most of her life in the "best European schools," and who could converse fluently in four European languages.

Except for an unpublished dissertation of some twenty years ago, this is the first biography of Wood to appear since 1856, when a biography of the then-mayor seemed appropriate. Mr. Pleasants has performed a real service in going over the Wood papers, other manuscript collections, as well as the newspapers of the period, and many other sources for this chronology of a corrupt politician's life. Fernando Wood did have some virtues, and the biographer very carefully discusses the mayor's fight for freedom from state interference in New York City's local affairs. Wood made other contributions, too, as, for example, in helping to create Central Park and in putting the New York police into uniform for the first time. But nothing in this book alters the impressions of Fernando Wood already

gained from other studies of this period. Nor, for that matter, does this study make the collaboration of Wood and his brother Benjamin, the editor of the fantastic *New York Daily News*, with the Copperheads during the Civil War any more appealing.

As has been indicated, this is a chronicle rather than an essay at social, political, or economic interpretation. This reviewer would have welcomed expansive treatment and interpretation of various stages in Wood's life as, for example, the struggle for Home Rule (later advanced by Wood to a proposal for a "Free City.")

A complete and suggestive bibliography is appended to the volume, as is an index, which is not at all complete. H. G. MELLMAN.

The Rural Press and the New South, by Thomas D. Clark. Baton Rouge. Louisiana State University Press. 1948. pp. 111. \$2.00

This is a brief study of the Southern rural press, which according to the author has been "one of the South's most human and useful institutions." Throughout, Clark, who heads the history department at the University of Kentucky, shows a maximum of sympathy for the South, and particularly the Southern weekly press. He asserts that much of the South's social and educational progress since the Civil War has been made thanks to the efforts of these weekly gazettes. Such an impact might reasonably be made by these papers since, as the author observes, many Southern rural folk read only their weekly newspaper and their Bible.

This short work can hardly be regarded as a definitive study but it does add its bit to interpretations of post-bellum Southern history. CLIFFORD J. REUTTER.

Book Notices

Europe in the Seventeenth Century, by David Ogg. Fifth edition. London. Adam and Charles Black. 1948. pp. viii, 576. \$5.50

This is a new edition of a text long accepted as standard for study of the seventeenth century of European history. The author has done a skillful piece of work in weaving together the many apparently discordant happenings of this century. His ignorance of religious issues of the century, however, mars this fifth edition of his book, as it did the earlier editions. Except for this serious defect, Ogg's arrangement of the history of the seventeenth century is the most satisfactory, though not the most scholarly, presentation of the subject.

T. P. N.

A Fire Was Lighted, by Theodore Maynard. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Co. 1948. pp. 443. \$3.50

This is the story of Rose Hawthorne Lathrop, daughter of the famed American author and founder of The Servants of Relief for Incurable Cancer. Hers was a full life which had advanced into middle age before Rose found in works of charity for Christ's very poor and horribly afflicted that full satisfaction which travel, romance, authorship, and the rest could not give. The

author has, very engagingly, recreated an American woman whose life spanned important American years three quarters of a century, ending in 1926. The book is interesting to those who follow the literature of converts to Catholicism; it is equally so to the historian who would probe into the inner workings of American life.

J. F. B.

Saint Peter the Apostle, by William Thomas Walsh. New York. The Macmillan Company. 1948. pp. 307. \$3.50

The late and lamented historian has turned his talents to this important early Christian study, adding it to the long list of works which deservedly won him his reputation. To reconstruct the life of Saint Peter was no easy task, for documentation was scarce. Mr. Walsh combed available sources, using archaeology and tradition, carefully sifted, as supplements to *New Testament* data. The result is satisfactory and enlightening and a real contribution, not only to hagiography, but also to history. The book is written in the author's characteristic pleasant and readable style. It is recommended to the historian who would know more of this important figure in early Christian annals. J. F. B.

A Catholic Dictionary, edited by Donald Attwater. (Second edition, revised.) New York. The Macmillan Company. 1949. pp. 552. \$5.00

This is the reissue, with additions and revisions, of a work with which many are familiar under the earlier title *The Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary*. It has already proved its worth, but this reviewer would like to remind historians, Catholic and non-Catholic, of its value as a book of easy, useful reference. It is precisely what it claims to be, a dictionary of Catholic terms, those words and titles and things in general which so often have only a hazy meaning, and which in such a state are so very liable to misinterpretation and misunderstanding. With such an excellent guide available there is no excuse for blunderings and ignorance. The definitions and explanations are short, clear, and to the point.

J. F. B.

The National Catholic Almanac, 1949. Paterson, N. J. St. Anthony's Guild. pp. 832. Paper, \$1.50; cloth \$2.00

Whoever has a *Catholic Encyclopedia* will need this fine volume to keep his information up to date; and whoever has no *Catholic Encyclopedia* will need it more. It offers—and well fulfills its promise—treatise on "Catholic doctrine and practice, history and organization, education and missions, social action and hospitals, books and authors," as well as general treatment of such fields as government and law, science and sports, radio and television, military information, and many others. It more than lives up to its claims of being "factual, comprehensive, and concise." A most useful handbook for reference and not without its peculiar fascination for more careful perusal.

L. J. K.